North Dakota Law Review
Volume 88

Number 3

Article 4

1-1-2012

Canons of Construction for the Interpretation of Mineral
Conveyances, Severances Exceptions, and Reservations in
Producing States
Daniel B. Kostrub
Roger S. Christenson II

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kostrub, Daniel B. and Christenson, Roger S. II (2012) "Canons of Construction for the Interpretation of
Mineral Conveyances, Severances Exceptions, and Reservations in Producing States," North Dakota Law
Review: Vol. 88 : No. 3 , Article 4.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol88/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.

CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION FOR THE INTERPRETATION
OF MINERAL CONVEYANCES, SEVERANCES, EXCEPTIONS,
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ABSTRACT
Exploring the application of the construction of canons to mineral
conveyances, this Article focuses on how courts interpret the definition of
“minerals” in seven oil and gas producing states. Unlike a concrete rule of
law or statute, a “canon” arises at a distinct stage in the decision making
process: to resolve irreconcilable ambiguities in the words of a contract,
and the intent of those words. While some similarities in these
interpretations exist among courts, often jurisdictions take distinct views on
the interpretation of mineral conveyances, severances, exceptions, and
reservations. In Part II, this Article provides a framework for understanding
canons and Part III explains specific canons frequently utilized when
referencing “minerals.” These canons are then analyzed with respect to
each of the seven states discussed in Part IV’s survey. Finally, Part V
provides recommendations and conclusions.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article explores application of construction canons to mineral
conveyance instruments, focusing on the judicial interpretation of
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“minerals” in nine oil and gas producing states.1 A canon of construction is
a metaphorical tool in the judicial belt that courts may utilize to ascertain a
written agreement’s legal effect.2 Canons are not “rules of law”3 that
demand strict adherence to yield a calculated result. Rather, when properly
applied by the courts, canons arise at a distinct stage in the decision making
process: to resolve irreconcilable ambiguities in the words of a contract,
once the actual intent of the parties thereto proves indecipherable.4 In some
states, an interpretation of a term or phrase by consistent application of
particular canons may acquire authoritative weight so that its construction
develops into a bright-line rule of property law.5 Much more common,
however, are instances in which the same words garner various
constructions within and across jurisdictions.6 As the impetus for given
interpretation is not always clear, this variety generally stems from relevant
circumstances making one canon more persuasive than another in achieving
an equitable status among competing policy aims. Unfortunately, this has
contributed to a patchwork of interpretive guideposts for future courts and
offers little practical direction for title examiners, attorneys, and industry
players assessing the risks of mineral investment.
This Article highlights a number of key procedural and policy concerns
that arise when courts have applied canons to construe the precise
ownership interest conveyed by a grant or reservation of “minerals.” Part II
provides a theoretical framework for understanding canons, focusing on
procedural aspects such as intent, ambiguity, and extrinsic evidence. Part II
also introduces specific canons frequently utilized to construe unclear
transfers of “minerals;” these canons will then be analyzed with respect to
each of the nine states surveyed within Part IV.

1. Part IV surveys this in Colorado, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Virginia.
2. See 6A POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 899(3) (“Canons of construction are merely
statements of judicial preference for the resolution of a particular problem. They are based on
common human experience and are designed to achieve what the court believes to be the ‘normal’
result for the problem under consideration.”).
3. See Bruce M. Kramer, Property and Oil and Gas Don’t Mix: The Mangling of Common
Law Property Concepts, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 540, 565 (1994) (“Courts may or may not use canons
to assist them in interpreting a document and they may choose from a host of canons, some of
which may be inconsistent.”).
4. See POWELL, supra note 2, § 899(3) (“Thus, their purpose is not to ascertain the intent of
the parties to the transaction. Rather, it is to resolve a dispute when it is otherwise impossible to
ascertain parties’ intent.”).
5. For example, in Pennsylvania, the Dunham Rule – a well settled rule of property that a
reservation of “minerals” does not include oil and gas – developed out of the application of the
community knowledge test. See infra Part IV.F.
6. See generally Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds and
Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1993).
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II. INTERPRETIVE PROCESS: CANONS’ POSITION ON THE
JUDICIAL DECISION SPECTRUM
The most common disputes over canons center on the proper time and
significance with which they should be applied. As Part II will discuss, the
court’s goal of effectuating the intent of the contracting to include in the
word “minerals,” introduces additional procedural concerns regarding
extrinsic evidence and its proper role in aiding interpretation. Part II
concludes with a discussion of underlying policy aims that frame this
procedural debate, and which courts must balance in applying canons to
mineral conveyance instruments.
A. A QUEST FOR CLEAR INTENT
Courts today uniformly follow a golden rule of contract interpretation:
a court will construe a written instrument to give effect to the clear intent
expressed by the parties when they entered the contract.7 This intent
becomes a unique creation of law and policy by which the so-called
“parties’ intent” becomes the “judicially-ascertained” intent.
In
determining the intent of the parties, the court considers such to the extent it
comports with the meaning that the parties’ words or dealings convey.8
A number of the concerns arising from canons applied at varying
stages of interpretation come to fruition in the courts’ construction of a
conveyance or reservation of “minerals.” As both a cause and effect
thereof, litigation to determine the scope and legal effect of a mineral grant
or reservation based on generalized descriptions such as “all minerals” or
“[specified substances] and other minerals” has reached the highest court of
most states.9 The consequences of the courts’ construction as to what
substances are included by this general language are paramount.10 Perhaps
due to the high stakes of this “mineral” definition, coupled with the absence
of a uniform common law definition of this term, these cases frequently
cause courts to confound basic notions of intent, sacrificing common sense
interpretation.11

7. See, e.g., Davis v. Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77, 81 (W. Va. 1963).
8. See David E. Pierce, Interpreting Oil and Gas Instruments, 1 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY
L. 1, 3 (2006).
9. See infra Part IV for a state survey; see also 1-2 WILLIAMS & MYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW
§ 219, at 258-59 (1997) (“The problem most frequently litigated is whether oil and gas are
included in a grant or reservation of ‘minerals.’”).
10. The canons, if any, the court applies may result not only in substantial business and
litigation expenses, but in some circumstances may wholly extinguish the purported rights of a
party to the transaction.
11. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 4-6.
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An important issue to consider in assessing the court’s determination of
intent at trial is jurisdiction: who is the proper arbiter of these disputes?
Regrettably, this issue is often overlooked: “It is remarkable that,
considering the number of cases in which the question of whether a
particular substance is a mineral arises, courts have infrequently addressed
whether the question is one of law or of fact.”12 A number of states have
held that particular aspects of a mineral grant construction are decided as a
matter of law, while some have labeled this a determination of fact.13 To be
sure, this initial procedural issue of law or fact is not always outcomedeterminative;14 however, the distinction merits attention in cases where it
leads the court to consider evidence beyond the instrument itself at the risk
of substantially undermining one party’s claimed rights under the written
agreement.15
Additionally, the intent analysis, for courts which have not adopted
bright-line rules, should be objective in nature. While the court seeks the
“actual” intent of the original parties, it should first limit its search for that
intent to consideration of the written language of the deed.16 As discussed
above, contract interpretation calls for the court to give the meaning to an
instrument as intended by the parties thereto. As a general rule, the court
presumes “that the parties intended the language to have its ordinary and
accepted meaning, unless there is clear expression of intent that the
language was used in a different sense.”17 For example, a provision

12. See, e.g., George E. Reeves, The Meaning of the Word ‘Minerals,’ 54 N.D. L. REV. 419,
441 (1978).
13. Compare Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 548 (N.D. 1973) (finding lignite
included in “minerals” conveyed as a matter of law); Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan Am. Petrol.
Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50, 55 (Tex. 1964) (holding the words “minerals” to include oil and gas as a
matter of law), with Mothner v. Ozark Real Estate Co., 300 F.2d 617, 624 (8th Cir. 1962);
Brizzolara v. Powell, 218 S.W.2d 728, 730 (Ark. 1949) (describing inclusion of substance general
“mineral” grant as a matter of fact).
14. See Reeves, supra note 12, at 442 (“It is probably more correct to say that it is a mixed
question of law and fact. In any event, it is a question to be decided in light of the purpose of the
instrument, the circumstances of the particular case, and the context in which the words of grant or
reservation are used.”). But see McCormick v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 14 P.3d 346, 355-54 (Colo.
2000) (holding that as a matter of law a reservation of “other minerals” reserves oil and gas and
that no extrinsic evidence will be admitted to vary that conclusion).
15. See, e.g., Lee v. Frank, 313 N.W.2d 733, 735 (N.D. 1981) (“Although ordinarily the
construction of a written contract to determine its legal effect is a question of law for the court to
decide, . . . the interpretation of the parties’ intentions as to the meaning of certain words or
phrases in a written contract may involve either a question of law or a question of fact depending
on whether or not the interpretation requires the use of extrinsic evidence. If the parties’
intentions in a written contract can be ascertained from the writing alone, then the interpretation of
the contract is a question of law for the court to decide.” (internal quotations omitted)).
16. See Graham v. Drydock Coal Co., 667 N.E.2d 949, 952 (Ohio 1996) (“The intent of the
parties is presumed to reside in the language they chose to use in their agreement.”).
17. See Reeves, supra note 12, at 454.
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granting or reserving “all minerals” creates a general presumption that all
substances the court finds “legally cognizable as minerals” are included.18
While this places the burden of supporting a more limited construction on
the party seeking that limitation,19 it is ultimately up to the court to decide
what this “legally cognizable” category included at the time of
conveyance.20
B. AMBIGUITY AND EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
The realm of judicial decision making, which deservedly brings the
most criticism to the use of canons, is their obfuscation of basic principles
concerning the admissibility of extrinsic evidence at trial.21 When a court
looks to a deed to ascertain the intent of the parties, as has already been
noted, it should first seek an objective and unambiguous expression shown
in the language of the instrument.22 As a general rule, the court’s finding
that the intent is clear and that the language creates no ambiguity requires
the court to refrain from construction or consideration of extrinsic
evidence.23 On the other hand, the court’s determination that deed language
is ambiguous opens the door for each party to introduce extrinsic evidence
to “prove” that its interpretation was the one shared by the parties at
contracting.24 In sum, longstanding procedural rules have consistently
placed a judicial finding of facial ambiguity as a condition precedent to the
admissibility of extrinsic evidence in contract disputes.
18. See MacMasters v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36, 41 (N.D. 1957) (“No word is more inclusive
than ‘all’ and it is difficult to see why, if the parties intended a restricted construction to be placed
upon the reference to other minerals, they should use a word so completely unrestricted in
meaning.”).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658, 660-61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (“No doubt
every inorganic component of the earth’s crust is legally cognizable as mineral, if the parties
affected choose so to deal with it; and this no doubt is true regardless of whether it may be
removed or extracted for commercial or other profitable purposes.”); see also Scott v. Laws, 215
S.W. 81, 82 (Ky. 1919) (acknowledging that a grant or exception of “all minerals” includes “all
inorganic substances which can be taken from the land,” and that in order to restrict that meaning,
“there must be qualifying words or language, evidencing that the parties contemplated something
less general”). But see Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 43-44 (1882) (acknowledging that if
the reservation of “minerals” was intended to be as broad as the scientific definition of that word,
it would be as broad as the grant and therefore void; thus, the court undertook to limit the
definition by applying a community knowledge test).
21. See, e.g., Reeves, supra note 12, at 455.
22. See, e.g., Graham v. Drydock Coal Co., 667 N.E.2d 949, 952 (Ohio 1996); Davis v.
Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77, 89 (W. Va. 1963).
23. Sensibly, such evidence would be superfluous – if the court decides that the instrument is
susceptible to a single reasonable interpretation, no amount of additional evidence could change
that. See, e.g., Miller Land & Mineral Co. v. State Highway Comm’n, 757 P.2d 1001, 1002
(Wyo. 1988).
24. See, e.g., Farrell v. Sayre, 270 P.2d 190, 192 (Colo. 1954).
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The most fervent criticism of courts’ reliance on certain canons to
construe mineral deeds centers on this ambiguity determination.25 As
discussed in Part III, many of the canons frequently employed to determine
the legal effect of a grant or reservation of “minerals” require the court to
consider surrounding circumstances to discern the parties’ intent.26 Those
who defend this reliance on outside evidence cling to the accurate notion
that such facts may be considered where parties’ “presumed intent
[inherently] consists of extraneous circumstances and conditions which
existed at the time and place of the transaction which produced the
conveyance.”27 However, courts often manipulate the process by admitting
such evidence in the first instance, rather than limiting the use of
surrounding circumstantial evidence to resolve ambiguous language.28 This
evidence has been admitted to shape the court’s initial determination
regarding the existence of ambiguity.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals offered a prime example
of this confusion in West Virginia Department of Highways v. Farmer.29 In
deciding whether sand and gravel were included within a reservation of
“oil, gas and other minerals,” the court accurately summarized West
Virginia precedent, which allowed extrinsic evidence only if necessary to
construe an instrument the court has found facially ambiguous.30 In the
court’s words:
It has long been held that where language in a deed is
unambiguous there is no need for construction and it is the duty of
the court to give every word its usual meaning. However, where
ambiguity is introduced by the restrictive language, making
unclear the intention of the grantors in reserving
minerals . . . construction of the language is in order and the
surrounding circumstances and actions of the parties may be
considered.31
With an interesting turn in logic, the court then contradicted this accurate
statement of the law in the very next sentence of the opinion, finding that
25. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 8, at 12.
26. See infra Part III for a discussion of the various canons.
27. ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW INST., 3-84 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING §
84.02[1][d][2], at 84-12 (2d ed. 2012) (citing cases).
28. See, e.g., id. § 84.01[3], at 84-9 (“What may be especially perplexing is the frequent
consideration by the courts of extrinsic evidence to determine whether or not there is ambiguity.
Only after ambiguity has been determined is resort to extrinsic evidence theoretically justified or
permissible.”); see also Pierce, supra note 8, at 12.
29. 226 S.E.2d 717 (W. Va. 1976).
30. Farmer, 226 S.E.2d at 719.
31. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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the generalized reservation of “other minerals,” when “considered along
with the surrounding circumstances and past activities concerning this
property, creates an ambiguity as to the [parties’] intent . . . .”32 Based on
this language, Farmer is often attacked for subverting parol evidence
standards by considering surrounding circumstances to create, rather than
resolve, ambiguity in the text.33 Nonetheless, other jurisdictions have
allowed evidence of surrounding circumstances at this “pre-ambiguous”
stage to aid in the intent pursuit,34 a practice which has been endorsed in the
Restatement of Property.35
The policy considerations discussed above are vital to the court’s
process of finding whether ambiguity exists in its construction of the term
“minerals.” However a court makes that determination, whether by means
of extrinsic evidence or not, if it determines that the instrument is
ambiguous, it must then decide what evidence may be admitted to resolve
the dispute. Even though at this point the deed has been declared
ambiguous, courts will still attempt to ascertain the parties’ intent as
determined by this new wider universe of evidence. Courts generally aim
to construe deed language as intended by the parties at the time and place of
the conveyance.36 In oil and gas disputes, this causes a host of practical
problems. Foremost among these is one of simple chronology: a typical
mineral title suit arises decades after the instrument(s) involved were
executed. The original parties to the contract are rarely involved at the
litigation stage.37 Moreover, it is often the case that these original parties
“have given no thought whatever to whether the substance in question
should be included in or excluded from the grant or reservation of
minerals.”38
In such cases, the court’s determination becomes more objective in
nature. The intent of the parties is determined to be simply that which a
reasonable person in similar circumstances would have intended, assuming
32. See id. (emphasis added).
33. See, e.g., Reeves, supra note 12, at 456 (suggesting that the Farmer court was
“apparently countenancing the use of extrinsic evidence to create an ambiguity in an otherwise
unambiguous reservation”).
34. See, e.g., Farmer, 226 S.E.2d at 719.
35. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 14 (citing RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 242 (1940)).
36. See, e.g., White v. Sayers, 45 S.E. 747, 749 (Va. 1903) (explaining that the term
“minerals” in the contract did not cover coal because at the time of contracting gold was the
minerals on the mind of people in that area, and coal did not become valuable until more than
forty years later). But see Scott v. Laws, 215 S.W. 81, 82 (Ky. 1919) (noting that in a previous
case in Kentucky, a deed of “all minerals . . . on described tract,” conveyed all minerals other than
those expressly excepted, and even conveyed diamond though neither party knew of its existence
on the property at the time or explored for it).
37. See, e.g., Reeves, supra note 12, at 444.
38. See id.
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that the relevant substance was specifically considered in the first
instance.39 Thus, the court’s purported “intent” finding may inherently
require it to consider extrinsic evidence and construct the scope of
“minerals” through use of circumstantial canons described below.40 As
discussed above, opening the door to outside evidence raises procedural
concerns and highlights the tension between the policy goals of freedom of
contract and stable, predictable title.41
C. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SHAPING JUDICIAL PROCESS
In order to appreciate the necessary-when-proper role that canons of
construction play in judicial decision making, it is vital to understand the
conflict that shapes them. Our deep-rooted legal traditions protecting a
general freedom to contract cannot be overstated. As such, the court’s
enforcement of a valid, lawful written agreement will always be constructed
upon this “intent-based” interpretive rule in contract and property disputes.
However, “the process by which intent is ascertained frequently determines
the meaning of the instrument. Manipulating process can manipulate
meaning.”42 This judicial “process manipulation” thus needs coherent and
fair balance between competing interests.43 In the oil and gas context,
courts must compromise two overarching policy aims: the traditional
protections of contractual freedom, and the alienability of real property
encouraged by the predictability of land titles.44
This tension was well covered in a recent work by Professor David
Pierce, in which he explained the “free will vs. predictability” dichotomy.45
First, there is a public “desire to give effect to the free will of the parties to
an instrument by recognizing and protecting ‘freedom of contract.’”46 The
courts endorse this policy by upholding the rights of parties to enter and
enforce the terms of their agreements.47
39. See id.
40. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Campbell, 69 So.2d 384, 386 (Miss. 1954) (“[I]n determining
the meaning of a conveyance or reservation of minerals, regard may be had not only of the
language of the deed, but also to the situation of the parties, the business in which they were
engaged and the substance of the transaction.”).
41. But see Gibson v. Sellars, 252 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Ky. 1952) (noting that unless the
language was “so ambiguous or obscure in meaning as to defy interpretation otherwise[,]” the
parol evidence rule barred extrinsic evidence to vary the terms of the contract).
42. See Pierce, supra note 8, at 2-4 (noting the parol evidence rule as clear example of
judicial process that frames a court’s search for meaning) (emphasis in original).
43. See id at 2 (“The important question in this jurisprudential scheme of things, ‘When
should process override meaning?’”).
44. See id. at 3, 5.
45. See id. at 3-14.
46. See id. at 3.
47. See id.
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Often pushing against this free-contract theory is “the desire for
predictability that can be obtained by adopting bright-line objective rules of
interpretation.”48 From this perspective, the courts should give greater
weight to considerations of title stability and predictability when construing
deeds. Stability would be most effectively achieved by establishing reliable
precedent to control interpretation in future cases; however, the practical
difficulty of applying such precedent to decades-old instruments remains a
strong barrier to such objectivity.49 In the absence of formal rules, one
avenue to greater predictability may come from improved consistency
within construction process; in particular, courts should clarify whether the
deed constructed as a matter of law or fact bears weight on the outside
universe of real estate conveyance.50
In construing oil and gas instruments, the courts must balance these
policies: freedom of contract, on the one hand, and the stability and
predictability of title, on the other. As the above discussion suggests,
clinging too tightly to one policy consideration will ultimately sacrifice the
other.51 In practice, free contract rights are further promoted with a courts’
enforcement of clear instrument language;52 however, the judicial process
“will accurately reflect the parties’ free will only to the extent the judge’s
perceptions of what is ‘unambiguous’ and what the language in the
instrument ‘means’ coincide with those of the parties.”53 Thus, this
balancing is achieved within the judicial decision making process that seeks
to effectuate the intent of the parties, but limits that inquiry to the extent
that such intent is expressed by the clear and unambiguous language of the
instrument.54 Of course, this search for objective intent itself may become a
confused and troublingly subjective method. While debate continues over
the appropriate role canons play in this arena, their current status remains
unfortunate as they fail to adequately promote contractual freedoms,
jeopardize title stability, and deprive the holders of surface and mineral
estates alike of consistent and predictable ownership.

48. See id. at 5.
49. See id. at 5-6.
50. See id. at 6.
51. See id. (“The basic problem with the competing policies of predictability and free will is
that one can only be maximized at the expense of the other.”).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 4.
54. See id. at 7 (“The only acknowledged compromise between predictability and free will
has been the rule that the search for intent is a search for the ‘objective’ intent of the parties as
opposed to their ‘subjective’ intent.”).
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III. CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION APPLIED:
WHAT IS A MINERAL?
The full gamut of canons of construction applied across jurisdictions is
nearly unquantifiable.55 To tailor the bounds of this mineral discussion, this
Part introduces canons most commonly endorsed by producing states,
including those detailed in Part IV’s multi-state survey. This Part discusses
these canons in two general categories with respect to their role in the
court’s application. Acknowledging theoretical questions in any attempt to
sever one “set” of canons from another, the first category of “textual”
canons concerns judicial construction of the actual instrument language,56
while the second category of “circumstantial” canons focuses more on the
court’s consideration of extrinsic evidence.
A. FOUR CORNERS AND HARMONIZATION
The interpretive principles known as the “four corners” and
“harmonization” canons are now uniformly-followed maxims of contract
interpretation. Though distinct, these work in tandem to describe the
objective intent sought by the court. Generally speaking, the four corners
doctrine calls upon the court to “ascertain the intent of the parties from all
of the language in the deed.”57 To the extent possible, the court will
consider the entirety of an instrument and afford each provision equal
weight in discerning an “overall intent” expressed by the deed.58
Rarely applied alone, the four corners typically couples with the
doctrine of harmonization to resolve ambiguities that arise when
considering an instrument in its entirety. This rule directs a court to
minimize openness to ambiguity by attempting to “harmonize all parts of
the deed” while holding the parties to have “intend[ed] every clause to have
some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement.”59
The court’s proper reliance on the four corners and harmonization
canons gives effect to all provisions of a deed and, to the extent possible,
even where they appear contradictory or inconsistent.60 In turn, no part of
the instrument should be struck “unless there is an irreconcilable conflict
55. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 2-6.
56. This first “textual” category includes: four corners and harmonization, plain meaning,
contra proferentum, and ejusdem generis.
57. Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991) (citing Garrett v. Dils Co., 299
S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. 1957)).
58. See, e.g., White v. Sayers, 45 S.E. 747, 749 (Va. 1903) (“In the construction of a contract
the whole instrument is to be considered; not any one provision only, but all its provisions . . . .”).
59. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462 (citing Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986)).
60. See id.
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wherein one part of the instrument destroys in effect another part
thereof.’”61 As shown in Part IV’s survey, this basic notion is often
overlooked by the courts.
B. PLAIN AND ORDINARY MEANING
As commonly applied to all types of contracts, courts frequently
employ a plain meaning approach to “minerals” in oil and gas
instruments.62 This canon steers the court’s construction toward a common,
ordinary definition of a word, in a way the court finds a reasonable member
of the relevant public would understand it.63 This canon’s impact rests on
the court’s delineation of the public of reference – thus its apparent
“textual” focus is inherently factual based on the relationship and dealings
between the contracting parties.
C. CONTRA PROFERENTUM
The canon of construction known as contra proferentum, or construe
“against the drafter,” has long been a cornerstone of contract dispute
resolution.64 Its application is simple and justifiable: because the drafting
party to a contract maintained final control over the language used, that
party should in turn bear the burden of ambiguities that later give rise to
litigation. Thus, contra proferentum holds that a court will resolve
ambiguity in the contract with deference to the nondrafting party.65
D. EJUSDEM GENERIS
The canon known as ejusdem generis is applicable only in cases where
mineral description at issue provides two or more specific substances
followed by the apparent catchall, “and all other minerals.” Ejusdem

61. Id. (quoting Benge v. Scharbauer, 259 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. 1953)).
62. See generally Pierce, supra note 8, at 20.
63. See, e.g., Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 43 (1882) (“The best construction is that
which is made by viewing the subject of the contract as the mass of mankind would view it;
for . . . it may be safely assumed that such was the aspect in which the parties themselves viewed
it.”); Witherspoon v. Campbell, 69 So.2d 384, 386 (Miss. 1954) (stating that when in doubt over
the meaning, the term should be given the meaning customary in the area in which the deed will
operate).
64. See, e.g., ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW INST., supra note 27, § 84.02[1][c], at 8411.
65. Some courts and authors label this canon “construe against the grantor,” but the canon
more accurately concerns the party that controls the final terminology used in the instrument
irrespective of the grantor-grantee status. See Dep’t of Highways v. Farmer, 226 S.E.2d 717, 720
(W. Va. 1976) (“[W]here an ambiguity exists in an instrument, the language will be construed
against the grantor.”); see also ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAW INST., supra note 27, § 84.02[1][c], at 8411.
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generis, meaning “of the same kind,” holds that “where general words
follow the enumeration of particular minerals, the general words will be
construed as applicable only to minerals of the same general character or
class as those enumerated.”66
The drawbacks to applying ejusdem generis consistently are readily
apparent. Despite its textual focus, courts lack any objective standard for
guidance in choosing the qualities that the named substances share, and
which of those will be determinative to define the class of minerals
conveyed or reserved together. For example, in Luse v. Boatman,67 a Texas
appellate court keenly explained:
If we should apply the rule of ejusdem generis, what qualities or
peculiarities of the specified type, “coal,” shall be considered in
determining the classification intended by the use of the word
“mineral”? Are we to classify according to value? If so, can it be
said that oil and gas on the one hand and coal on the other are of
different kinds or species of minerals? If we classify as to use, is it
not true that all three are used for fuel? Shall the classification be
determined by the form, density, color, weight, value or uses of the
particular species mentioned? . . . [A]re we justified in limiting the
minerals intended to be included in the reservation to those only
which are found in a solid state?68
These observations in Luse have garnered significant support, leading some
courts to reject the canon altogether.69
Nonetheless, many courts continue to cite ejusdem generis to support a
given deed construction, so long as the resulting construction does not
vitiate the plain meaning of the language.70 As observed over a century ago
by the Supreme Court of Utah in rejecting an ejusdem generis analysis,
canons of construction in general must retain their proper place in the
court’s construction and therefore “must not be applied so as to make them
masters, since they are designed as servants merely.”71 Moreover, this
66. See, e.g., McKinney’s Heirs v. Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co., 120 S.W. 314, 314, 316-17
(Ky. 1909) (finding that a deed that conveyed “all minerals such as coal, iron, silver, gold, copper,
lead, bismuth, antimony, zinc or any other minerals of any marketable value,” did not convey gas
because the phrase “any other minerals of any marketable value” was limited to substances of the
same character as those previously named (emphasis added)).
67. 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. 1919).
68. Luse, 217 S.W. at 1099.
69. See, e.g., id. at 1099-1100; Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 549 (N.D. 1973); see
also Reeves, supra note 12, at 447.
70. See, e.g., West v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 536 P.2d 393, 396-401 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975)
(applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis to determine that “oil, gas and other minerals” did not
include any interest in copper, silver, gold, or any type of metallic ores or minerals).
71. Nephi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab Cnty., 93 P. 53, 56 (Utah 1907).
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canon generally does not apply if its impact would undermine what the
court has deemed to be the parties’ clear intent in closing the mineral class –
either with “all-encompassing” language or “where the particular things
enumerated are complete so that there remains not others of like kind.”72
E. COMMUNITY KNOWLEDGE TEST
The first “circumstantial” canon relevant to this discussion is the socalled community knowledge test. This test establishes the principle that
the term “minerals” should be defined as the relevant community
understood it at the time and place of conveyance.73 Significant policy
concerns arise from judicial reliance on the community knowledge test. By
its very definition, this canon calls for circumstantial evidence of general
perceptions, interpretations, and similar norms with respect to the
referential public or community. As such, several courts and commentators
denounce the community knowledge test because it requires a court to
consider extrinsic evidence from the outset.74 When its focus weighs so
heavily on such extrinsic showings as a matter of course, a court risks
undermining the primary, proper goal of its inquiry: to determine the
meaning of contract language as it was understood, intended, and written by
the executing parties. Much like pitfalls related to ejusdem generis noted
above, a court applying the community knowledge standard must ultimately
draw the line somewhere in establishing the scope of the relevant
community. In doing so, the court inherently may define the term by virtue
of framing the community to its conclusion, rather than the more
appropriate inverse.75 As such, even a sound application of the community
knowledge test is often criticized canons for an over-reliance on
particularized facts that can offer no predictable guidance beyond the case
at hand. In other words, this test is “nothing but legal fluff to support
whatever result the trier [sic] of fact thinks is fair in a particular case.”76

72. See Reeves, supra note 12, at 450.
73. See, e.g., White v. Sayers, 45 S.E. 747 (Va. 1903) (interpreting the term “minerals” based
upon the intentions at the time and place the deed was executed).
74. See, e.g., David E. Pierce, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law: The
Continuing Search for Analytical Foundations, 47 ANN. INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX. §
1.02[2][a], at 1-5 (1996) (“[The community knowledge test] has proven to be a rather fickle test
and therefore custom made for the sort of result-oriented shell game jurisprudence needed to ‘do
equity’ in individual cases.”); McCormick v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 14 P.3d 346, 353 (Colo. 2000)
(noting that when courts base decisions upon evidence of the original parties’ intent many decades
later, it leads to more litigation and uncertainty).
75. See, e.g., McCormick, 14 P.3d at 353 n.7 (criticizing reliance on extrinsic evidence to
find intent, stating that such “intent” is too often a result of the rules of evidence relating to proof
and presumption more than a result of the parties’ actual intent).
76. See Pierce, supra note 74, at 1-5.
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Even so, this test is one of the most popularly applied canons among the
states included in the state survey herein.77
F.

SURFACE DESTRUCTION TEST

Another fact-based standard, the surface destruction test, has been
followed by a number of jurisdictions.78 This canon is typically applied
where a grant or reservation of “other minerals” is purported to encompass
extraction techniques that threaten the value of the severed surface estate.79
In this scenario, a court applying the surface destruction test may consider
extrinsic evidence to determine whether extraction of the disputed mineral
genuinely jeopardizes the surface estate. If surface destruction is likely to
follow proposed extraction, the court will refuse to include such substances
within the minerals conveyed.80
Since its early popularization in Texas, the surface destruction canon
has been reformulated on numerous occasions.81 This test gained
substantial criticism after its application by the Texas Supreme Court in
Acker v. Guinn,82 which called for immediate referral to extrinsic evidence
of extraction practices to aid its initial determination of what minerals were
conveyed by generalized language.83 Acker caused particular backlash
because the court’s destruction finding provided the fundamental basis for
its holding, even where that construction was in direct conflict with clear
language in the instrument.84
In response, the Texas Supreme Court eventually undercut the breadth
of the surface destruction test in Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp.85 The Moser
court lamented reliance on outside facts as a source of uneasiness in the
marketplace: because Acker “required the determination of several fact
issues to establish whether the owner of the surface or the mineral estate
owns a substance not specifically referred to in [the instrument] . . . it could

77. See infra Part IV.
78. See, e.g., Shores v. Shaffer, 146 S.E.2d 190, 193 (Va. 1966) (determining that a grant of
“minerals” did not include sand and gravel, partially based upon the following rationale: “The
sand and gravel on the Shores tract are an integral part of the surface. . . . [T]here was no other
way possible to remove the sand except by going in from the surface; [] any sort of deep mining
would cause the top to collapse because it is all sand . . . ”).
79. Id. (“The sand under the surface could not be removed without taking the surface.”).
80. See Pierce, supra note 74, at 1-6.
81. See Brant M. Laue, Note, Interpretation of “Other Minerals” in a Grant or Reservation
of a Mineral Interest, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 618, 624-26 (1986).
82. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
83. Acker, 464 S.W.2d at 351-54.
84. See, e.g., Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984); Reed v.
Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 746-47 (Tex. 1980).
85. 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984).
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not be determined from the grant or reservation alone who owned title to an
unnamed substance.”86 The court rejected an argument that mineral
ownership findings should rest on surface damage showings, as it provides
no predictable guidance and sacrifices the interest in title stability.87 Today,
Texas courts adhere to Moser’s clearer, plain meaning approach in place of
the rule in Acker.88 In fact, the court expressly held that “a severance of
mineral in an oil, gas, and other minerals clause includes all substances
within the ordinary and natural meaning of that word, whether their
presence or value is known at the time of severance.”89
IV. STATE SURVEY
Part IV analyzes primary case law from several jurisdictions,
highlighting the courts’ application of relevant canons of construction to
resolve ambiguous use of the term “mineral” in describing the property
conveyed or reserved by a given instrument. To determine mineral
ownership, courts are often required to interpret language in deeds executed
decades earlier. To add difficulty to this complex task, courts must
recognize that although the language in any particular deed has remained
static, the mineral extraction industries have evolved significantly as a
result of new discoveries and advances in technology. For that reason,
parties to an instrument, or their successors, frequently disagree over the
effect of a conveyance many years later and rely on a court of competent
jurisdiction to settle the dispute.
One issue that has spawned considerable litigation in producing states
is the effect of using the term “minerals” in a deed, whether in the grant or
in the exception or reservation, to describe a particular mineral estate. As
an example, a deed conveying fee title will describe the relevant tract of
land and designate a particular substance, e.g., coal, which the grantor will
retain. Rather than explicitly listing all substances included in the
reservation, the specifically enumerated substance is frequently followed by
general terms, such as “and other minerals” or “and other valuable
minerals.” The arguably ambiguous nature of this appendage causes
conflict when parties later disagree over exactly what substances were
thereby conveyed (or reserved). This is especially true when it is indeed

86. Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 101 (citing Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 750 (Spears, J.,
Concurring)).
87. See id. at 104-05.
88. See Laue, supra note 81, at 634-38.
89. Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 102.
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those “other minerals,” rather than the substances explicitly stated, that
become the object of a very lucrative industry.90
The resolution of the question “[w]hat does the term ‘minerals’ mean?”
has been different among the several states, depending upon the approach
taken. Courts have applied various canons of construction, including the
community knowledge test, ejusdem generis, the rule of practical
construction, the exceptional use or value test, and construe against the
grantor (or drafter). In a few states, the interpretation of “minerals” has
become a matter of property law, and no extrinsic evidence will be
admissible to alter the meaning attributed by settled precedent.91 However,
most states allow extrinsic evidence to be admitted if the language is
ambiguous or is susceptible to more than one interpretation.
A. COLORADO
Colorado courts have applied the community knowledge test in the
past, although the definition of “minerals” in this context, to an extent, is
now a matter of property law. In 1954, the Supreme Court of Colorado was
asked to settle a dispute over whether “minerals” included sand and gravel.
In Farrell v. Sayre,92 the court interpreted a special warranty deed from
1940 that contained the following language: “excepting and reserving all
mineral and mineral rights and rights to enter upon the surface of the land
and extract the same.”93 The entire surface of the land consisted of sand
and gravel, and the landowner, Ferrell, and the grantor, Sayre, disagreed as
to who owned that gravel.94 The Supreme Court of Colorado noted that
when the reservation is in general terms, the decision will turn upon the
intent of the parties at the time of the execution of the deed.95 Because the
surface was nothing but sand and gravel, the court found it “surely was not
contemplated that the parties intended to nullify the grant without some
direct specification in the reservation.”96 The controlling principles were as
follows:
[F]irst, . . . the word “minerals” when found in a reservation out of
a grant of land means substances exceptional in use, in value and
90. As stated by the North Dakota Supreme Court, “[i]t is seldom mentioned that one of the
properties of a mineral is that often, when newly discovered in valuable quantities, it creates
lawsuits.” Lee v. Frank, 313 N.W.2d 733, 734 (N.D. 1981).
91. See, e.g., infra Part IV.A, F.
92. 270 P.2d 190 (Colo. 1954).
93. Farrell, 270 P.2d. at 191.
94. Id. at 191-92.
95. Id. at 192.
96. Id. The court also stated that the trial court wrongly considered acts of the plaintiff,
Farrell, “who was not a party to [the original] deed,” and other mere side transactions. Id.
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in character . . . and does not mean the ordinary soil of the district
which if reserved would practically swallow up the grant . . . ; and
secondly . . . in deciding whether or not in a particular case
exceptional substances are “minerals” the true test is what that
word means in the vernacular of the mining world, the commercial
world and landowners at the time of the grant, and whether the
particular substances was so regarded as a mineral . . . .97
Less than ten years later, the Court of Appeals of Colorado again
decided whether a reservation of “oil, gas and other minerals” operated to
reserve gravel.98 The court noted the reservation of “all minerals” is
“inherently ambiguous” and referred to the controlling principles stated in
Farrell, before deciding that it was proper for the trial court to have
considered extrinsic evidence.99 The evidence showed the topsoil of the
entire parcel was underlain by gravel and that at the time of the reservation
the term “mineral” did not, as a matter of law, include gravel.100 The court
then stated the trial court would have had a duty to bring within the
meaning of “mineral” any substance the parties actually intended, whether
or not that substance met the criteria set forth in Farrell.101 In Morrison,
however, the parties did not intend gravel to be included in the
reservation.102 The foregoing cases evidence an attempt by the court to give
meaning to the original parties’ intent with resort to these “controlling
principles.”
As recently as 2000, the Supreme Court of Colorado was again asked
to determine what was intended by the term “minerals.” In McCormick v.
Union Pacific Resources Co.,103 landowners sought to quiet title to the oil
and gas in various tracts of land that had been conveyed by way of five
deeds from the Union Pacific Railroad Company (“UPRC”) between 1906
and 1909.104 Three of those deeds reserved “all coal and other minerals
within or underlying said lands,” and two reserved “all oil, coal and other
minerals within or underlying said lands.”105 The landowners claimed the

97. Id. at 192-93 (quoting Waring v. Foden, 86 A.L.R. 969, 979 (1932)).
98. Morrison v. Socolofsky, 600 P.2d 121, 122 (Colo. App. 1979).
99. Id. (stating the court below considered maps prepared by the Colorado Geological Survey
and results of test hole drilling).
100. Id. This conclusion was also based upon testimony of a geologist consultant in the
gravel industry and agricultural lenders and landowners as to the common meaning of the term
“mineral.” Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 123.
103. 14 P.3d 346 (Colo. 2000).
104. McCormick, 14 P.3d at 347-48.
105. Id. at 348.
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(1) failure to specify oil and gas as to three properties and gas as to two
properties, (2) lack of much oil and gas production in the area at the time of
conveyance, and (3) UPRC’s progressive insertion of particular substances
in its deed reservation language as industries developed (i.e., from “coal” to
“coal and oil” to “coal, oil, and gas”) all demonstrated UPRC’s intent not to
include those substances in the reservation.106 The landowners requested a
trial on the issue with the inclusion of this “extrinsic evidence” to show the
parties’ intent.107
The Supreme Court of Colorado initially agreed with the lower courts,
finding “the term ‘other minerals’ in a deed reservation in Colorado has the
settled meaning of including oil and gas.”108 The court then stated the
relevant issues in the appeal, which were cases of first impression: (1) is
the term “minerals” in a general deed reservation unambiguous as a matter
of law, such that no extrinsic evidence may be admitted to show a contrary
intent; and (2) does “minerals” include, as a matter of law, all oil, gas and
valuable subsurface substances?109 The court held that “Colorado adheres
to the majority rule that the deed reservation language ‘other minerals’
reserves oil and gas.”110 To support this statement, it confirmed that
subsurface minerals may be severed from the surface estate.111 Although
the word “mineral” can take on different meanings in different contexts,112
“the trial court’s determination [of] summary judgment was appropriate in
this case.”113 In making this determination, the court relied on esteemed
commentary, such as the following:
Barring the unusual case where ambiguities exist in the language
of [a] grant or reservation and parol evidence is allowed to prove
what was really intended in a given conveyance, the law is
basically settled . . . . Barring other factors, most courts today will
hold or have held that a general grant or reservation of “minerals”

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (restricting the effect of the finding to oil and gas only and not to other minerals)
(emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 349.
112. Id.
113. Id. Note that although the court holds that Colorado follows the majority rule that a
reservation of “minerals” includes “oil and gas” and that this meaning is “settled,” it appears to
limit this holding, as does the commentary it cites, by using phrases such as “in this case,”
“[b]arring the unusual case where ambiguities exist,” and “unless there was a demonstrated
intention to the contrary.” Id. at 347, 341, 351.
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or of “all minerals” will be inclusive of oil and gas and all
constituent hydrocarbons.114
The courts are practically unanimous in holding that oil and gas
are minerals in the broad and general sense in which that term is
used. These decisions would seem to fix a common standard of
meaning on the term, and it is a general rule, adhered to by a
majority of the courts, that a conveyance or exception of minerals
includes oil and gas, unless from the language of the instrument, or
from the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties at the
time of its execution, it is found that the term was used in a more
restricted sense.115
The majority position is to construe a general reference to
“minerals” to include oil and gas unless there was a demonstrated
intention to the contrary.116
In most of the producing states it is a rule of property that the term
“minerals” includes oil and gas unless the instrument creating the
mineral interest by grant or reservation reveals that the parties
intended the term to have a more restrictive meaning. Extrinsic
evidence of intent in this regard is generally admissible only where
the language of the instrument is ambiguous.117
The court then discussed the reservations in the case at bar. It gave the
history of the grants to UPRC and of the various conveyances from UPRC
using deed forms that included reservations like those at issue.118 Rather
than look to the language of the instruments themselves, the court noted that
its sister states of Wyoming, Utah, and Arizona have all conclusively held
the term “other minerals” in these railroad conveyances includes oil and
gas.119 Based on the precedent in other states, on “Colorado precedent,
114. Id. at 349 (quoting Phillip G. Dufford, Conveying Oil and Gas Interests, in CATHY
STRICKLIN KRENDL, 1B COLORADO METHODS OF PRACTICE § 10.1, at 9-10 (1997)).
115. Id. at 351 (quoting 1A W.L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 135, at 268
(1954)).
116. Id. (quoting Robert G. Pruitt Jr., Mineral Terms – Some Problems in Their Use and
Definitions, 11 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1, 12 (1966)) (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 351 n.2 (quoting HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS
TERMS 427 (1981)) (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 352-53.
119. Id. at 353 (citing Anschutz Land & Livestock Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 820 F.2d 338,
343 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying Utah law); Union Pac. Land Res. Corp. v. Moench Inv. Co., 696
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custom, usage, and learned commentary,” and on the need for an
established rule of law that provides certainty rather than the need to rely on
extrinsic evidence, the court determined the issue is a legal question that
precludes resorting to extrinsic evidence and allows resolution by summary
judgment.120
In coming to this conclusion, it appears the court chose to disregard the
analysis used, for example, in the Tenth Circuit case interpreting Utah law,
Anschutz Land & Livestock Co. v Union Pacific Railroad Co.121 In that
case, rather than finding that extrinsic evidence should never be admitted to
determine whether the parties intended the phrase “other minerals” to
include “oil and gas,” the court appeared to read the clause as a whole to
determine that it unambiguously included “oil and gas;” based on that
determination, extrinsic evidence was not admitted to alter the clear
intention shown on the face of the document.122 The McCormick court also
appears to disregard the limiting language provided in the above
commentary which seems to apply the majority “rule” more as a rebuttable
presumption: that is, it should apply unless language exists to show a
contrary intent.123
The court skipped analysis of the deed as a whole to find that “other
minerals” always includes “oil and gas.”124 It noted “[a]llowing the
introduction of extrinsic evidence many decades after the deed
conveyances . . . invites uncertainty and litigation, as necessary evidence
has long since disappeared or sheds no real light on the parties’ individual
intentions.”125 Additionally, “[a]ll too often this ‘intent’ as determined,
results from application of the rules of evidence concerning burden of proof
and presumptions, which have little relevance to the actual intent of the
parties.”126 Based on the foregoing policy considerations, the court
F.2d 88, 93 (10th Cir. 1982) (applying Wyoming law); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Guild Trust, 636 F.2d
261, 264 (10th Cir. 1980) (applying Wyoming law); Spurlock v. Santa Fe. Pac. R.R. Co., 694 P.2d
299, 308-09 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)); Miller Land & Mineral Co. v. State Highway Comm’n, 757
P.2d 1001, 1002-03 (Wyo. 1988).
120. Id. at 354.
121. 820 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1987).
122. Anschutz Land & Livestock Co., 820 F.2d at 343 (recounting and adopting the district
court’s interpretation of a reservation of “all coal and other minerals,” which looked at the
language in question in the context of the entire clause to determine that oil and gas was included
as a matter of law and that no extrinsic evidence was admissible). It is not clear whether this court
intended its holdings to apply to all instances of the term “other minerals” or only to the term
when used in similarly drafted instruments.
123. See generally Pierce, supra note 74.
124. This approach does, however, appear to be in line with most of the above-cited
opinions. See, e.g., Spurlock v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 694 P.2d 299, 308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984);
Miller Land & Mineral Co. v. State Highway Comm’n, 757 P.2d 1001, 1002 (Wyo. 1988).
125. McCormick v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 14 P.3d 346, 353 (Colo. 2000).
126. Id. at 353 n.7.
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concluded this matter should be treated as one of property law, and
precedent acted to foreclose the question for trial.127 Therefore, as a matter
of law in Colorado, “other minerals” includes oil and gas, and it appears
that parties may not resort to extrinsic evidence to show contrary intent.
B. KENTUCKY
The effect of the term “minerals” in a deed, whether contained within
the grant or within an exception or reservation, has a well settled meaning
in Kentucky, which includes oil and gas unless a contrary intent is clearly
indicated. In reaching this conclusion, Kentucky courts have used a
practical construction approach and appear to reject both the community
knowledge and exceptional characteristics tests. The Court of Appeals of
Kentucky first decided the issue in 1919 in the case of Scott v. Laws.128
There, the grantor conveyed “all of the mineral right and coal privileges and
rights-of-way to and from said minerals and coal privileges; also the right to
search for all undiscovered minerals and coals upon the lands hereinafter
described.”129 The court answered the first question relating to the interest
granted, i.e., that this was a grant of title to the minerals, not just a mining
privilege.130 It then addressed the contention that oil and gas did not
pass.131
The plaintiff relied on the case of McKinney’s Heirs v. Central
Kentucky Natural Gas Co.,132 to assert the grant should not include oil and
gas.133 In that case, the deed conveyed “all minerals, such as coal, iron,
silver, gold, copper, lead, bismuth, antimony, zinc or any other mineral of
any marketable value.”134 The Court of Appeals determined that the gas did
not pass because the words “any other minerals of any marketable value”

127. Id. at 354. Note the concurring opinion in this case took issue with the court’s analysis.
It states the majority failed to follow general principles of deed interpretation which state that (1) a
primary goal of deed interpretation is to give effect to the parties’ intent, (2) intent may be found
by extrinsic evidence if a deed is found to be ambiguous, (3) whether an ambiguity exists is a
matter of law to be determined by the court, and (4) in deciding whether an ambiguity exists, a
court may conditionally admit extrinsic evidence on the issue of ambiguity. Id. at 354-55.
Furthermore, the concurrence claims that by relying on the historical information to ascertain the
meaning of the term “minerals,” the majority determines an issue of fact within the purview of a
trial court and denied the landowners an opportunity to present their evidence to show a contrary
meaning. Id. at 355.
128. 215 S.W. 81 (Ky. 1919).
129. Scott, 215 S.W. at 82.
130. Id. at 81-82.
131. Id.
132. 120 S.W. 314 (Ky. 1909).
133. Scott, 215 S.W. at 82.
134. Id.
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should be read in conjunction with the things previously named.135 For that
reason, the conveyance should be limited to things of a similar nature,
which did not include oil and gas.136
Scott acknowledged generally, a grant or exception of all minerals
“will include all inorganic substances which can be taken from the land, and
to restrict the meaning of the term there must be qualifying words or
language, evidencing that the parties contemplated something less general
than all substances legally cognizable as minerals.”137 The court then
referred to Kentucky Diamond Mining & Developing Co. v. Kentucky
Transvaal Diamond Co.138 to distinguish McKinney.139 The Kentucky
Diamond Mining opinion held “a deed of ‘all minerals . . . on described
tract,’ excluding coal for the use of the farm, conveyed all the minerals
excepting the coal reserved” and passed diamond even though neither party
knew of its existence or prospected for it at the time.140 Therefore, because
oil and gas are minerals and nothing in the deed before the Scott court
evidenced an intent to convey anything less general than all substances
legally classifiable as minerals, the oil and gas passed.141
The foregoing issue has been presented before the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky in numerous other cases where parties have sought a
determination that the variation in their granting or reserving clause
distinguished their deed from established precedent. However, the same
result has been applied to a wide array of language, which as noted in the
1952 case, Gibson v. Sellars:142
This court has long since established the rule that the term
“minerals” includes oil and gas, and that a reservation or exception
of “coal and minerals” excepts the oil and gas.
The many variations of the term which have been given the effect
of including these substances are well illustrated by the specific
provisions involved in the several cases. In the Scott case, the
term was “all the mineral right and coal privileges.” In the
135. Id. (quoting McKinney’s Heirs v. Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co., 120 S.W. 314, 315 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1909)).
136. Id. (citing McKinney’s Heirs v. Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co., 120 S.W. 314, 315-16 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1909)). Note the application of ejusdem generis in the McKinney case.
137. Scott, 215 S.W. at 82.
138. 132 S.W. 397 (Ky. 1910).
139. Scott, 215 S.W. at 82.
140. Id. (citing Ky. Diamond Mining Developing Co. v. Transvaal Diamond Co. 132 S.W.
347, 398-99 (Ky. 1910)). Note the rejection of the community knowledge and exceptional
characteristics tests in the Kentucky Diamond Mining case.
141. Id.
142. 252 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1952).

672

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88:649

Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. case [86 S.W.2d 164 (Ky. 1935)]
it was “all the coal, salt water, and minerals.” In the Hurley case
[171 S.W. 16 (Ky. 1943)] it was “all the coal, mineral and mining
rights.” The rule has been followed even though the conjunction
“and” is omitted. In the Berry case [198 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1946)],
it was concluded that an exception of the “coal mineral rights”
excepted the oil and gas. In the Hosick case [39 S.W.2d 667 (Ky.
1931)], an exception of “coal minerals and mining privileges” was
given the same effect.143
In Gibson, the deed exception at issue was as follows: “It is expressly
understood and agreed by the parties that the coal and mineral rights
underlying said tract of land have been heretofore sold by the First Party
and are not intended to be conveyed by this deed and are expressly
excluded therefrom.”144 However, the single prior out-conveyance was of
coal only; therefore, the appellee argued that, when considered in light of
the prior conveyance, the exception only covered coal, not oil and gas.145
The court declined to consider the prior transaction, citing the parole
evidence rule.146
The parole evidence rule is a substantive rule of law as applied to
contracts that requires the terms to be found in the writing itself. 147 If the
language has an obscure meaning or is susceptible to more than one
meaning, extrinsic evidence may be introduced to clarify the language, but
use of such extrinsic evidence is limited to cases where language “is so
ambiguous or obscure in meaning as to defy interpretation otherwise.”148
The fact that oil and gas had not been conveyed did not destroy the
exception as to it; rather it was “at most only an erroneous recitation of fact
and did not limit or restrict the effect of the exception.”149 The court found
itself limited to construing the language in the deed without resort to the
terms in prior conveyances to vary or alter the meaning of the words in the
exception.150

143. Gibson, S.W.2d at 913 (citations omitted).
144. Id. at 912.
145. Id. at 912-13.
146. Id. at 913.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 914.
150. Id. at 913 (“An extension of the [parol evidence] rule would result in chaos and
confusion, and it would be impossible to determine the rights of the parties to a contract without
viewing all the circumstances surrounding the execution of the document in question.”); see also
Kentucky-West Virginia Gas Co. v. Browning, 521 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1975).
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The foregoing cases, as well as an assortment of other cases resolving
similar disputes, have come to the same conclusion, that is, the word
“mineral” in a deed includes oil and gas unless the language of the deed
shows an intention to exclude those substances.151 Restrictive language,
however, has rarely been found to show an intention that oil and gas does
not come within the meaning of “minerals.”152 In at least in one instance,
the court determined a conveyance of “coal minerals and mineral products”
was ambiguous enough, due to the absence of commas, to warrant resort to
testimony to determine if “coal” was used as an adjective qualifying
“minerals” (in which case oil and gas was not included), almost identical
language in more recent cases has been held to include oil and gas.153 And,
as previously mentioned, this result is the same even if the parties to the
deed did not know the particular substance was underlying those lands and
the parties were not currently prospecting for same.154
C. MISSISSIPPI
The interpretation of the word “minerals” in Mississippi, at least so far
as that word applies to cover oil and gas, appears to be settled. In
Witherspoon v. Campbell,155 the Mississippi Supreme Court was asked to

151. See, e.g., Majors v. Easley, 328 S.W.2d 834, 835 (Ky. 1959); Gibson v. Sellars, 252
S.W.2d 911, 912-13 (Ky. 1952); Sellars v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Ky.
1952); Berry v. Hiawatha Oil & Gas Co., 198 S.W.2d 497, 497 (Ky. 1946); Fed. Gas, Oil & Coal
Co. v. Moore, 161 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Ky. 1941); Maynard v. McHenry, 113 S.W.2d 13, 14 (Ky.
1938); Ky. W. Va. Gas Co. v. Preece, 86 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Ky. 1935); Hudson v. McGuire, 223
S.W. 1101, 1103 (Ky. 1920).
152. Rice v. Blanton, 22 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Ky. 1929). But see Sellars v. Ohio Valley Trust
Co., 248 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Ky. 1952) (analyzing language that arguably could restrict the deed to
only mining activity, coupled with a restriction that explicitly did not convey rights to surface use,
but still determining that because no clear intention to retain oil and gas existed, it passed with the
conveyance).
153. See, e.g., Hudson v. McGuire, 223 S.W. 1101, 1101, 1102, 1106 (Ky. 1920) (overruling
demurrer to plaintiff’s petition and allowing plaintiff to present extrinsic evidence concerning “the
situation of the parties, the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed, and that it was
not intended by the grantor or grantee that oil or gas rights or privileges should pass under it”
where the conveyance was of “[a]ll the minerals (except stone coal), with necessary right of ways
and privileges for prospecting, mining and smelting . . . . ,” because none of those terms could be
applied to oil and gas production). But see Berry v. Hiawatha Oil & Gas Co., 198 S.W.2d 497,
498 (Ky. 1946) (construing a reservation of “all coal mineral rights” to include oil and gas because
punctuation is generally given only slight consideration, and “while the language of the
reservation is faulty,” it was the result of negligence or inadvertence, not ignorance; “a proper
construction of the reservation in question is that all minerals, including coal, were reserved in the
deed in question”); Hurley v. West Ky. Coal Co., 171 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Ky. 1943); Franklin
Fluorspar Co. v. Hosick, 39 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Ky. 1931).
154. See, e.g., Scott v. Laws, 215 S.W. 81, 82 (Ky. 1919) (citing Ky. Diamond Mining &
Developing Co. v. Ky. Transvaal Diamond Co., 132 S.W. 397 (Ky. 1910)).
155. 69 So. 2d 384 (Miss. 1954).
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determine whether “all minerals” included gravel.156 The court applied
various canons of construction in making the determination, including the
rule of practical construction, the community knowledge test, and ejusdem
generis.157
To determine the meaning of the conveyance or reservation, the court
in Witherspoon allowed resort to the language used in the particular
instrument, the parties’ situation and business endeavors, and the substance
at issue.158 The court noted that when in doubt, the meaning of the term
should be restricted to that given by the custom of the country in which the
deed is to operate.159 Although the court previously held “minerals”
included gravel in Moss v. Jourdan,160 a case decided more than thirty years
earlier, in Witherspoon it analyzed the changes that had taken place in
Mississippi to conclude the Moss case was overruled.161
The facts the Witherspoon court relied upon to overrule Moss were
several. First, even in Moss, the appellant was deemed the owner of the
gravel due to his ownership of the minerals, but the appellee was not
enjoined to interfere with removal of gravel because of the surface
destruction it would cause.162 Second, in 1922, it was unknown whether
oil, gas, or similar minerals existed in Mississippi, but the Tinsley Oil Field
was discovered in Yazoo County in 1939 and grantors and grantees have
been “oil and gas conscious in the execution of conveyances and
reservations of minerals” since that time.163 Third, gravel is not typically
included in transactions covering “solid” minerals, unless specifically
mentioned.164 Fourth, parties who contract for “all the minerals” in place
generally do not contemplate the open pit mining associated with gravel,
which would destroy or devalue land.165 Finally, these transactions often
list the relevant substances as “oil, gas and other minerals;” the doctrine of
ejusdem generis can be applied so that only minerals of similar character to
oil and gas are included within the more general term of “other
minerals.”166 Based on the foregoing, it is apparent Mississippi courts rely

156. Witherspoon, 69 So. 2d at 385.
157. See generally id.
158. Id. at 386. Note, however, that testimony of conversations between the parties was not
considered competent for trial. Id.
159. Id.
160. 92 So. 389 (Miss. 1922).
161. Witherspoon, 69 So. 2d at 389.
162. Id. at 386.
163. Id. at 388. Here the court made use of community knowledge.
164. Id. at 387.
165. Id. at 388. Note use of the surface destruction test.
166. Id.
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heavily on the circumstances at the time and place of execution to
determine the meaning intended by the term “minerals.” Because it
concluded that oil and gas has been on the mind of grantors and grantees in
the state since the discovery of oil and gas in 1937, presumably for all
transactions entered into after that time, the term “minerals” encompasses
those substances unless a contrary intent is clearly shown.
D. NORTH DAKOTA
North Dakota presents an unusual situation that has resolved many
interpretive questions by statute. North Dakota also has statutorily
determined the answer to what minerals will be included in a conveyance.
However, for contracts entered into prior to enactment of those statutes and
for contracts to which the statutes do not apply, courts have tended to use a
practical construction when giving meaning to the term “minerals.”
In Lee v. Frank,167 the Supreme Court of North Dakota was asked to
determine the meaning of the following exception and reservation in a 1945
deed:
[E]xcepting and reserving, however, from these presents all ores
and minerals beneath the surface of the above described premises,
with the right to mine for and extract the same, provided that in the
exercise of such mining right the surface thereof shall not be
disturbed or interfered with and in nowise damaged. . . .168
The parties agreed this clause effectively reserved coal to the grantors, but
disagreed over the effect on the oil and gas rights. After analyzing the issue
based upon North Dakota precedent, the court determined this language
effectively reserved all the oil, gas, coal, and other hydrocarbons.169
As an initial matter, it was acknowledged that the term “minerals” is
susceptible to multiple meanings, which may either be broad or narrow in
scope, depending upon the context.170 When the term is used in a
reservation in a written document, the general rule is that it indicates an
intention to reserve all substances qualifying as “minerals.”171 It therefore
becomes necessary to find qualifying circumstances, words, or context to

167. 313 N.W.2d 733 (N.D. 1981).
168. Lee, 313 N.W.2d at 733-34.
169. Id. at 734.
170. Id. (“A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in
which it is used.” (internal quotation marks omitted (citations omitted))).
171. Id. (“Ordinarily then, the substance must appear in nature as a mineral and not merely
be an element capable of being synthesized in a laboratory into a mineral.”).
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determine what substances are included, by looking to the words used,
custom and usage, statutes, precedent, or common sense.172
The North Dakota Supreme Court previously determined the
classification of minerals in this situation cannot be so broad that it defeats
the grant by effectively reserving all of the soil itself.173 Oil and natural gas
are generally considered “minerals,”174 as is coal175 and the term “mine”
may be used to refer to oil and gas drilling operations.176 This precedent,
however, did not supply a “rule-of-thumb formula” by with which to
answer the question at issue.177
To find qualifying context, the Lee court also referred to statutory
provisions in the North Dakota Century Code.178 The Code contains
provisions that are applicable to the interpretation of “minerals” in
conveyances of mineral rights. Those sections are as follows:
All conveyances of mineral rights or royalties in real property in
this state, excluding leases, shall be construed to grant or convey
to the grantee thereof all minerals of any nature whatsoever except
those minerals specifically excluded by name in the deed, grant, or
conveyance, and their compounds and byproducts, but shall not be
construed to grant or convey to the grantee any interest in any
gravel, clay, or scoria unless specifically included by name in the
deed, grant, or conveyance.179
In all deeds, grants, or conveyances of the title to the surface of
real property executed on or after July 1, 1983, in which all or any
portion of the minerals are reserved or excepted and thereby
effectively precluded from being transferred with the surface, all
minerals, of any nature whatsoever, shall be construed to be
reserved or excepted except those minerals specifically excluded
by name in the deed, grant, or conveyance and their compounds
and byproducts. Gravel, clay, and scoria shall be transferred with
172. Id. Note the court’s use of the rule of practical construction.
173. Id. (quoting Salzseider v. Brunsdale, 94 S.W.2d 502, 503 (N.D. 1959)). See generally
Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971).
174. Id. (quoting State v. Amerada Petro. Corp., 49 N.W.2d 14, 15 (N.D. 1951)).
175. Id. (citing Abbey v. State, 202 N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1972)); see also Olson v. Dillerud,
226 N.W.2d 363, 365-68 (N.D. 1975); Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 549 (N.D. 1973)
(explaining why ejusdem generis does not work to exclude coal when the specific term “oil and
gas” is followed by the general term “other minerals”).
176. Lee, 313 N.W.2d at 734. (citing MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36, 41 (N.D. 1957)).
177. Id. at 735.
178. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24, -25 (1999).
179. Id. § 47-10-24. The language provided is current, although this statute has undergone
various edits since its enactment. Because the current discussion is focused primarily on the
court’s interpretation when the statute does not apply, other versions are not provided.

2012]

CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

677

the surface estate unless specifically reserved by name in the deed,
grant, or conveyance.180
Based upon the holding of the North Dakota Supreme Court in
McDonald v. Antelope Land & Cattle Co.,181 the reservation in Lee was not
subject to the foregoing limiting statutory provisions, because that deed was
executed prior to their enactment.182 However, the Code provides several
sections applicable to all real property conveyance contracts, as follows:
Grants shall be interpreted in like manner with contracts in general
except so far as is otherwise provided by this chapter. . . . [I]f
several parts of a grant are absolutely irreconcilable, the former
part shall prevail. A clear and distinct limitation in a grant is not
controlled by other words less clear and distinct.183
A grant shall be interpreted in favor of the grantee, except that a
reservation in any grant, and every grant by a public officer or
body, as such, to a private party, is to be interpreted in favor of the
grantor.184
The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation if the
language is clear and explicit and does not involve an absurdity.185
A contract may be explained by reference to the circumstances
under which it was made and the matter to which it relates.186
All things that in law or usage are considered as incidental to a
contract or as necessary to carry it into effect are implied
therefrom, unless some of them are mentioned expressly therein.
In such case, all other things of the same class are deemed to be
excluded.187
Because the court did not find (1) words of limitation in the
reservation, (2) a limiting statute in effect at the time of the conveyance, or
(3) qualifying custom, usage, circumstance, or context, it interpreted the
reservation in favor of the grantor per North Dakota Century Code section
47-09-13.188 Therefore, its final conclusion was that the exception and

180. Id. § 47-10-25. Because, as stated in the preceding footnote, we are not focused on the
statutory interpretation, a history of the various forms of this statute is not given.
181. 294 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1980).
182. McDonald, 294 N.W.2d. at 393.
183. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-11 (1999).
184. Id. § 47-09-13.
185. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-02 (2006).
186. Id. § 9-07-12.
187. Id. § 9-07-21 (setting out a modified version of ejusdem generis).
188. Lee, 313 N.W.2d at 737.
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reservation effectively “reserved ‘all’ metallic minerals and ‘all’ metallic
ores, plus ‘all’ non-metallic solid, liquid or gaseous mineral whether known
or later discovered (except insofar as it may be interpreted in a manner to
defeat the conveyance of the soil itself).”189
The foregoing discussion shows that a factor of primary significance in
interpreting North Dakota mineral deeds is to determine whether the
particular instrument is subject to the limiting statutes. For instruments
entered into prior to the enactment of the limiting statutes,190 the courts will
rely on precedent to interpret the language. The Reiss v. Rummel191 opinion
shows how significantly the results can differ when courts use legal
precedent versus statutory interpretation. In Reiss, a mineral deed subject to
the limiting statutes conveyed a fractional interest in certain enumerated
minerals such as oil and gas and “all other minerals.”192 The court noted
that although North Dakota precedent interprets the phrase “all other
minerals” to include coal,193 that phrase “was insufficient to convey any
interest in coal because it did not meet the specific requirements set out by
statute.”194 Regarding language not subject to the statutes, a court will
likely follow the process set out in Lee to determine if a particular substance
was intended, requiring an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the
transaction in question.195
E. OHIO
Several cases in Ohio have dealt with the interpretation of oil and gas
conveyances that are unclear as to which estate is conveyed and which is
189. Id.
190. See McDonald v. Antelope Land & Cattle Co., 294 N.W.2d 391, 393 (N.D. 1980)
(holding that the statute does not apply retroactively).
191. Reiss v. Rummel, 232 N.W.2d 40 (N.D. 1975).
192. Reiss, 232 N.W.2d at 41-42.
193. Id. at 45 (citing Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 549-51 (N.D. 1973); Abbey v.
State, 202 N.W.2d 844, 856 (N.D. 1972); Adams Cty. v. Smith, 23 N.W.2d 873, 875 (N.D.
1946)).
194. Id. Also, the Rummel court determined that North Dakota Century Code section 47-1024 was meant to be limited “only to those real property transactions where the owner conveyed
mineral rights under the circumstances outlined by the statute,” and that its provisions do not
apply to those transactions where grantors retained mineral rights by reservation or exception; the
term “conveyed” in that section does not take on the meaning as defined in section 47-19-42. Id.
at 48.
195. See MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36, 42-43 (N.D. 1957) (interpreting the meaning
of “all other minerals” using canons of construction similar to those in Lee).
It is thus clear that it would be not only impractical, but impossible to attempt to
catalogue all the minerals which are, and which are not, included in the grant in the
lease under consideration. Decision as to whether any specific mineral is included in
the lease must await a case in which an issue as to that mineral is raised.
Id. at 43.
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excepted or reserved from the conveyance. The courts have proffered
several guidelines by which to interpret deeds. Among them is the notion
that the purpose of interpreting the deed is to discern the parties’ intent,
which is “presumed to reside in the language they chose to use.”196
Extrinsic evidence may be used to determine intent when the deed is
unclear or ambiguous “or when circumstances surrounding the agreement
give the plain language special meaning.”197 Lastly, a contract is construed
against the party who drew it.198
Of course, these and other canons of construction may not have much
significance in the abstract. It is as applied to real deed provisions that they
take on meaning. The Supreme Court of Ohio interpreted the following
conveyance of a mining right in the case of Detlor v. Holland:199
Do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey to the said [Grantee], his
heirs and assigns, forever, all the coal of every variety and all the
iron ore, fire clay and other valuable minerals in, on, or under the
following described premises: . . . , together with the right in
perpetuity . . . of mining and removing such coal, ore or other
minerals; and . . . the right to the use of so much of the [surface] of
the land as may be necessary for pits, shafts, platforms, drains,
railroads, switches, sidetracks, etc., to facilitate the mining and
removal of such coal, ore, or other minerals and no more.200
One question in front of the court was whether the preceding language
was sufficient to convey the oil and gas rights to the property, i.e., do the
words “other valuable minerals” include petroleum?201 The court held that
the right to petroleum oil in fact did not pass. 202 Although the words “other
valuable minerals” in a technical sense does include petroleum, the court
clarified that the real question was whether the parties intended to include
such oil in the mining right.203 In answering that question, the court
considered the conveyance “in the light of the surrounding circumstances,
and in view of the above rule of construction,”204 and upon authority of the
196. Graham v. Drydock Coal Co., 667 N.E.2d 949, 952 (Ohio 1996).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Detlor v. Holland, 49 N.E. 690 (Ohio 1898).
200. Detlor, pt. 1 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 692.
202. Id. at 692-93.
203. Id. at 692.
204. Id.
In determining what is included in a lease, the familiar rules of construction are
applied. The grant is construed most strongly against the grantor. The whole contract
must be considered in arriving at the meaning of any of its parts. Terms are to be
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case of Dunham & Short v. Kirkpatrick.205 The court noted that the grantor
had no knowledge of oil in the area at that time and relied heavily upon the
terms of the deed, which contained no language applicable to oil and gas
operations or of extracting minerals of a migratory nature.206
The Ohio Court of Appeals has also had occasion to interpret deeds
covering mineral rights. In Stocker & Sitler, Inc. v. Metzger,207 a 1914 deed
conveyed certain described property, but in the same paragraph as the
description, the grantors excepted a portion as reserved by the granting
clause:
Excepting there is reserved unto said grantors, all the veins of coal
and other substances of value underlying said above conveyed
premises, together with all necessary rights of way and privileges
of entry thereon to remove same, unto them, their heirs and assigns
forever.208
The question before the court was whether the exception reserved the oil
and gas estate to the grantors. The court looked to existing precedent of
several states before looking to Ohio case law. First, it noted that subjective
testimony evidence as to the parties’ intent is inadmissible to vary the terms
in a written contract.209 Also, parol evidence was “inadmissible to
contradict or change the legal effect of a deed in determining the nature of
the estate conveyed,” but rather the intent of the parties as evidenced by a
construction of the whole instrument “in the light of the circumstances of
each case” is controlling.210 The only objective evidence of circumstances
provided in this case was the fact that oil had been struck on the property,
and that hundreds of leases had been recorded in the county in the

understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense, unless they have acquired a
particular technical sense by the known usage of the trade. They are to be construed
with reference to their commercial and their scientific import. This rule is of especial
importance when the question arises whether a specific mineral is included in a
general designation.
Id.
205. Id. See generally Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 43 (1882) (holding that a
reservation of “all minerals” does not include oil). See infra Part IV.F for a discussion of
Pennsylvania law, including the Dunham case.
206. Detlor, 49 N.E. at 692-93.
207. 250 N.E.2d 269 (Ohio 1969).
208. Stocker, 250 N.E.2d at 270.
209. Id. at 270 (emphasis added).
210. Id. at 273-74. Oddly, the court says that parol evidence is not admissible to change the
legal effect of a deed, but rather that the court may determine the intent of the parties, which does
affect the interpretation and therefore legal effect of a deed, by looking to the “circumstances of
each case,” i.e., objective evidence of circumstances as of the time of execution.
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preceding year, both factors which indicate the parties were aware of oil
and gas activities.211
The Court of Appeals compared the language in issue to the language
in the Detlor decision.212 The deed in Detlor, which included “other
valuable minerals” in the granting clause, was not held to convey oil and
gas. As we have previously noted, the Ohio Supreme Court in that case
focused on the fact that the easements conveyed in connection with mining
were not applicable to oil and gas operations, and that the circumstances
surrounding Detlor were such that the grantor had no knowledge of oil
being produced in the relevant area and only minimal production was in fact
taking place.213 The Court of Appeals determined that the language of the
easements in Stocker was not as restrictive, but in fact, was broad enough to
cover both coal production and oil and gas production.214
Moreover, the court in Stocker reviewed two other appeals court cases
that arrived at seemingly inconsistent results. In Gordon v. Carter Oil
Co.,215 the granting clause of a 1902 deed conveyed “[a]ll the coal and other
minerals under the surface of the [described] real estate.”216 The grant
included an easement “to enter upon said land, make all excavations, drains,
entries, and structures of whatever nature as may be necessary to
conveniently take out said minerals, with a right of way over and across
said land for the purpose of transferring said minerals. . . .”217 That court
relied on Detlor to conclude that the transfer did not include oil and gas.218
However, it did not set forth all the information relied upon other than to
say that “under all the facts, circumstances, and surroundings of the case –
if the testimony is to be relied upon – that the parties hereto did not intend
or contemplate that oil and gas should be conveyed to the grantee in the
deed now before us for construction.”219
The same court decided the case of Hardesty v. Harrison,220 which
construed the terms of a 1919 deed conveying coal, clay, and mineral rights
on the relevant land.221 The decision, joined by Judge Houck who wrote the
211. Id. at 273.
212. Id. at 273-74.
213. Id. (citing Detlor v. Holland, 49 N.E. 690, 692-93 (Ohio 1898)).
214. Id. at 274.
215. 19 Ohio App. 319 (1924).
216. Gordon, 19 Ohio App. at 319-20.
217. Id. at 320.
218. Id. at 323.
219. Id. at 322. Note that the text appears to indicate that parol testimony evidence, namely
testimony of the facts, circumstances, and surroundings of the case, was admitted, although we do
not know to what extent.
220. 6 Ohio Law Abs. 445 (Ohio App. 1928).
221. Hardesty, 6 Ohio Law Abs. at 446.
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Gordon decision four years earlier, found that oil and gas was included.222
The opinion stated that although the defendant offered testimony that at the
time of the conveyance only nonmigratory minerals were intended, parol
evidence was not admissible to vary the terms of the contract; therefore,
whatever was said on that earlier occasion could not be used in interpreting
the words of the contract.223 Further, citing a Kentucky Court of Appeals
case, the Ohio court stated, “it is a well settled law that petroleum oil is a
mineral and is a part of the realty, like coal, iron and copper. A grant
without qualifying or limiting words of the minerals underlying certain real
estate will include oil or gas.”224
The averment in Hardesty that the law was well settled to include
petroleum in a grant of “minerals” perhaps meant to refer to law in other
states, but it appears to have overstated the certainty on that point in Ohio,
at least as of 1928. In particular, the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in
Detlor specifically determined that “other valuable minerals” did not
include petroleum because the intention to include it was not made clear by
the deed’s language in light of the circumstances.225 That holding in Detlor
stands in stark contrast with the holding of Hardesty, which stated oil and
gas was included in a conveyances of “minerals” unless the language
showed an intention not to include it.
After comparing the Gordon and Hardesty decisions, the Stocker court
referred to Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, to note the primary split
of authority concerning this issue:
1. The term “other substances of value underlying the premises”
includes oil and gas unless other language in the instrument so
restricts the definition of the term to exclude them.
2. The term “other substances of value underlying the premises”
does not include oil and gas unless other language in the
instrument indicates that the term has been used with the intent to
include them.226
Looking to Sloan v. Lawrence Furnace Co.227 for support, the court
determined that Ohio cases relating to “terms of general description appear
to have followed the first rule.”228 The language quoted from Sloan is
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
added).
227.
228.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *7 (citing Hudson v. McGuire, 233 S.W. 1101, 1103 (Ky. App. 1920)).
See Detlor v. Holland, 49 N.E. 690, 692-93 (Ohio 1898).
Stocker & Sitler, Inc. v. Metzger, 250 N.E.2d 269, 275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969) (emphasis
29 Ohio St. 568 (Ohio 1876).
Stocker, 250 N.E.2d at 275.
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“[t]he words ‘reserving all the minerals underlying the soil,’ in the granting
clause of a deed for the conveyance of real estate, constitute, prima facie, an
exception of the minerals from the operation of the grant.”229
Unfortunately, the question before the court in the Sloan case was not
whether “minerals” included the oil and gas estate, but rather whether the
term “reserving” was intended to act as a reservation or as an exception.230
However, although not well settled at the time of Hardesty, the trend in
Ohio may well be that the later in time a deed was executed, the more likely
the parties intended a grant or reservation of “minerals” to include the oil
and gas estate. In support of this, we look to the dates of the relevant deeds
discussed above. The Deltor case dealt with a deed executed in 1890,231
and the Gordon case dealt with a deed executed in 1902.232 Both of those
cases concluded that oil and gas was not intended by the relevant language,
partly based upon the circumstances, which suggest oil was not yet
commonly produced.233 The Stocker opinion stated that during 1913,
hundreds of leases had been executed and that oil had been struck on the
land in question.234 Further, that court stated “[w]e are certain . . . that if
one were to ask any oil and gas man or any layman to name substances of
value underlying premises, each would give oil and gas high priority among
the substances named.”235 For that reason, the court determined that oil and
gas was included within the exception.236 Appreciating that Ohio courts
look to the circumstances surrounding the particular transaction, then, may
help explain why the Hardesty case, in interpreting a 1919 deed, found the
law was well settled that oil and gas was intended by the term
“minerals.”237
Based on the foregoing discussion, it appears Ohio courts rely on the
community knowledge and exceptional characteristics tests to determine
what the parties intended “minerals” to include. As the circumstance

229. Id.
230. See generally Sloan, 29 Ohio St. 568 (Ohio 1876).
231. Detlor v. Holland, 49 N.E. 690, 692 (Ohio 1898).
232. Gordon v. Carter Oil Co., 19 Ohio App. 319, 319 (1924).
233. Detlor, 49 N.E. at 692-93; Gordon, 19 Ohio App. at 322-23.
234. Stocker, 250 N.E.2d at 274.
235. Id. at 275. It is unclear whether the court is referring to people as of 1969 or as of 1914,
although from language on page 274 of the opinion, it appears the court believed this applied in
1914, as well as at the writing of the opinion.
236. Id. (“By the words used in the deed, the designation of substances has but two
qualifications. The first is that they be of value, which can only mean of such worth as to make
feasible their removal. The second is that they are underlying the ground. This can leave no
question as to oil and gas but explains why coal, which is frequently stripped from the surface,
was separately specified.”).
237. See generally Hardesty v. Harrison, 6 Ohio Law Abs. 445 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928).
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changed and as the mineral extraction industry grew, the interpretation of
“minerals” appears to have expanded in the absence of limiting language.
This highlights the underlying issue that drafters using the same or very
similar terms in deeds in Ohio may not be able to rely on static precedent in
interpreting such language, but rather, must keep in mind the fluidity of the
mineral extraction industry. As technology improves and previously
unrecoverable resources are tapped, this issue may again be broached in the
not so distant future.
F.

PENNSYLVANIA

In Pennsylvania, the meaning given the term “minerals” in a
conveyance of land was initially interpreted using a community knowledge
test. Now, however, the meaning is well settled – so well settled, in fact,
that Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions have referred to the
interpretation as a “rule of property [that] will not be disturbed.”238 In the
seminal case of Dunham v. Kirkpatrick,239 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania decided that a reservation of “all minerals” did not include
a reservation of oil.240 The court initially admitted that a strict scientific
interpretation of the word “minerals” necessarily includes petroleum.241
However, all inorganic substances are technically minerals; therefore, if the
reservation was intended to be as broad as the scientific definition of
“minerals,” it would be as broad as the grant and therefore void.242 For that
reason, it was necessary to limit the meaning.
The method for limiting the definition of minerals used in Dunham is
as followed: “[t]he best construction is that which is made by viewing the
subject of the contract as the mass of mankind would view it; for . . . it may
be safely assumed that such was the aspect in which the parties themselves
viewed it.”243 The opinion noted that most people considered substances of
a metallic nature to be minerals.244 “Certainly, in popular estimation
petroleum is not regarded as a mineral substance any more than is animal or
vegetable oil, and it can, indeed, only be so classified in the most general or
scientific sense.”245 With the foregoing in mind, the court concluded that

238. Highland v. Commonwealth, 161 A.2d 390, 398 (Pa. 1960) (quoting Preston v. South
Penn Oil Co., 86 A. 203, 204 (Pa. 1913)).
239. 101 Pa. 36 (1882).
240. Dunham, 101 Pa. at 44.
241. Id. at 43.
242. Id.
243. Id. (citation omitted). Note the court’s resort to the community knowledge test.
244. Id. at 44.
245. Id.
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parties surely intended the word to take on its popular understanding and
that they probably were not even aware that the property was underlain by
petroleum.246 Further, if the parties had intended to reserve the petroleum
oil, the court stated that they should have expressly done so in clear
terms.247
A quarter of a century later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took up
an almost identical question: did the reservation of mineral rights include
natural gas? In Silver v. Bush,248 the conveyance was of certain “pieces or
parcels of land . . . together with all and singular the . . . hereditaments and
appurtenances whatsoever thereunto belonging, or in anywise appertaining,
and the reversions and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof; and all
the estate, right, title, interest, property, claim and demand whatsoever, of
the [grantor].”249 The habendum clause read “to have and to hold the said
piece or parcel of land except the minerals underlying the same and the
right of way to and from said mineral which the first parties reserve.”250
The court in Silver went through much the same analysis as in
Dunham, such as stating that the meaning of minerals must be limited so
that the reservation will not fail for overbreadth.251 It noted that the word,
as has previously been mentioned, has both a very broad scientific meaning,
but also a presumptive “commercial” usage in the context of a real property
conveyance.252 In the commercial sense, the term “minerals” can mean
“any inorganic substance found in nature having sufficient value separated
from its situs as part of the earth to be mined, quarried or dug for its own
sake or its own specific uses.”253 A given substance may or may not, then,
fit within this commercial meaning of “mineral,” depending upon “the
circumstances and the intent of the parties.”254
At that point, the court recited the Dunham rule, that petroleum was not
included in a reservation of “minerals,” which consequently takes natural
gas out of the scope of the word.255 The court noted, parties may avoid
operation of the Dunham rule by clear and convincing evidence that the
words were used in a different sense.256 In that case, the parties asserted
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id.
Id.
62 A. 832 (Pa. 1906).
Silver, 62 A. at 832-33.
Id. at 833 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. This sounds like a type of exceptional-characteristics test.
Id.
Id. at 833-34.
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that at the time the deed was executed, the land was already being
developed for natural gas and it was known that such gas was a “marketable
commodity.”257 This evidence was deemed insufficient to overcome the
burden to remove the case from the Dunham rule, and the court again stated
that “if the parties intended to include gas they would have said so
expressly.”258
After Silver, the Dunham rule has resurfaced several times. In 1913,
the court decided Preston v. South Penn Oil Co.,259 which held that oil and
gas was not included in a reservation of minerals, noting that “Dunham v.
Kirkpatrick has been the law of this State for thirty years . . . and it will not
be disturbed.”260 In the 1953 case of Bundy v. Myers,261 the court held a
reservation of “oil” along with “coal, fire clay and minerals” to exclude
natural gas.262 The defendant assignees in that case asserted the rule of
ejusdem generis to conclude that the reservation of oil included natural gas,
as gas was as much a mineral as the oil, which was expressly reserved.263
The court countered that if gas was intended to be included, why was only
oil expressly reserved?264
As shown in the above discussion, from time to time the Dunham rule
has been challenged. The resulting cases, including Silver and Bundy, have
acknowledged that some Pennsylvania cases have defined oil and gas as
minerals.265 Indeed, one case interpreted a lease for “mines and minerals,”
by stating the term “‘[m]inerals’ embraces everything, not of the mere
surface, which is used for agricultural purposes . . . .”266 That same
discussion is likewise taken up in a more recent case. In Highland v.
Commonwealth,267 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged that a
257. Id. at 834.
258. Id.
259. 86 A. 203 (Pa. 1913).
260. Preston, 86 A. at 204.
261. Bundy v. Myers, 94 A.2d 724 (Pa. 1953).
262. Bundy, 94 A.2d at 725-26.
263. Id. at 726.
264. Id. Note that it is difficult to square this with the court’s language in Silver: “It was
held, therefore, that petroleum was not within the intent of the parties in reserving the minerals.
And, a fortiori, natural gas would not be so included.” Silver, 62 A. at 833. “Petroleum” in Silver
apparently referred exclusively to “oil,” because the word is used in reference to the Dunham
decision, which covered petroleum oil, and the Silver opinion distinguished the two substances by
saying, e.g., that some cases have decided that “petroleum and gas” are minerals.
265. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Dewitt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889) (“Gas, it is true is a
mineral, but it is a mineral with peculiar attributes . . . .”); Gill v. Weston, 1 A. 921, 923 (Pa.
1885) (“[Petroleum] is a mineral substance obtained from the earth by a process of mining . . . .”);
Appeal of Stoughton, 88 Pa. 198, 201 (1879) (“Oil, however, is a mineral, and being a mineral is
part of the realty.”).
266. Griffin v. Fellows, 81 Pa. 114, 124 (Pa. 1873).
267. 161 A.2d 390 (Pa. 1960).
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number of decisions cited have included petroleum and natural gas within
the definition of “minerals,” but also that “it has been held that in other
connections they are not included under that term.”268 In accounting for the
difference, the court stated that “[t]he variations in the scope of the word
arise from the connection and application in which it is used.”269 The
primary question is “what was the sense in which the parties used the
word?”270 Although general interpretation is that it does not include oil and
gas, the parties may offer clear and convincing evidence that they “so
understood or intended the word, “mineral” or even that it had acquired a
usage in conveyancing which would include [those terms].”271 In the
Highland case, seven deeds were at issue, two of which, it was averred,
conveyed the natural gas rights by the terms “other minerals” as interpreted
in light of the surrounding circumstances and by later events. 272 The court
specifically referenced a host of factors in finding the “clear and convincing
evidence” burden was not overcome, among them that the mining of coal
was the principal objective of the conveyances, and that the deeds made no
express reference to natural gas as provided in others executed
simultaneously therewith.273
From the foregoing discussion, we see that Pennsylvania courts do not
wholly dismiss the idea that the term “minerals” as used in a deed could be
construed as including oil and natural gas. However, the default position
has been to hold that oil and gas are not included without a showing by
clear and convincing evidence that the parties intended otherwise. To date,
the burden has proved so difficult to overcome that the only way to ensure a
successful conveyance of those substances is by expressly referencing
them.274
Because of the settled nature of this law, Pennsylvania courts have not
relied heavily on canons of construction. In a more recent case, however, a
new aspect of the Dunham rule was considered, and the court referenced
multiple canons in its opinion. Butler v. Charles Powers Estate275
268. Highland, 161 A.2d at 398.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 393-98.
273. Id. at 399-400 (finding the above factors respectively bolstered by an absence of oil or
gas exploration on the relevant tracts, as well as “a high degree of selectivity and precision of
language” in drafting the contrasting deed descriptions).
274. See, e.g., New Shawmut Mining Co., v. Gordon, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 477, 482 (Pa. Ct.
Com. Pl. 1963) (noting that the words “boring for” and “crude” do not provide clear and
convincing evidence that oil and gas was intended, as they have applicability in coal operations, as
well).
275. 29 A.3d 35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).
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addressed whether the Dunham rule works to construe the term “mineral”
as including unconventional Marcellus shale gas. The appellants argued
that shale gas should be included, based upon the following rationale: the
deed at issue was written before the Dunham decision, which resulted in
what they claimed to be a “depart[ure] from past precedent”276; and the
Dunham and Highland decisions are distinguishable from the present case,
because they dealt with conventional gas which was in the nature of ferae
naturae, or “free flowing ‘wild’ gas,” not unconventional Marcellus shale
gas.277 The nature of Marcellus gas makes a difference, appellants asserted,
because it is deposited in a dense rock formation and requires hydraulic
fracturing to produce.278 Because of this distinction, they relied on U.S.
Steel Corp. v. Hoge279 to support their position of “whoever owns the shale,
owns the gas.”280
The Butler court stated that when interpreting a deed, the following
canons apply:
[A] court’s primary object must be to ascertain and effectuate what
the parties themselves intended.
The traditional rules of
construction to determine that intention involve the following
principles. First, the nature and quantity of the interest conveyed
must be ascertained from the deed itself and cannot be orally
shown in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake. We seek to
ascertain not what the parties may have intended by the language
but what is the meaning of the words they used. Effect must be
given to all the language of the instrument, and no part shall be
rejected if it can be given a meaning. If a doubt arises concerning
the interpretation of the instrument, it will be resolved against the
party who prepared it. To ascertain the intention of the parties, the
language of a deed should be interpreted in the light of the subject
matter, the apparent object or purpose of the parties and the
conditions existing when it was executed.281

276. Butler, 29 A.3d at 40.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983).
280. Butler, 29 A.3d at 40 (citing United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1383-84
(Pa. 1983)), see also United States Steel Corp., 468 A.2d at 1383-84 (“[A]s a general rule,
subterranean gas is owned by whoever has title to the property in which the gas is resting. . . .
Although coalbed gas contained in coal is, ab initio, property of the coal owner, that owner may
allow others certain rights respecting the gas.”).
281. Butler, 29 A.3d at 40 (quoting Consolidation Coal Co. v. White, 875 A.2d 318 (Pa.
Super. 2005)); see Brookbank v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co., 131 A.2d 103, 107 n.6 (Pa. 1957), for
the following additional note on deed construction:
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This language appears to require that the court determines the parties intent
not by what they subjectively intended their words to mean. Rather, it must
look to the objective meaning the language should be given “in the light of
the subject matter, the apparent object or purpose of the parties and the
conditions existing when it was executed.”
Yet, the court did not engage in an analysis of the foregoing canons.
Instead, it continued by noting the specialized construction of the term
“minerals” as used in a deed based upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
precedent previously discussed herein.282
Interestingly, however, it
overturned the trial court’s decision that Dunham is controlling.283 Instead,
it remanded for further proceedings so the parties can consult appropriate
experts relating to: (1) whether Marcellus shale itself is a “mineral”; (2)
whether the gas contained therein is a conventional gas of the nature
contemplated in Dunham and Highland; and (3) whether the Marcellus
shale is similar in nature to coal to the extent that whoever owns the shale
owns the gas.284 The appellees, who claim the shale gas is not within the
definition of mineral, have appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
which appeal was granted.285 Thus, even now this “well settled” law is in
flux, and we may see a landmark decision in the coming months.
G. WEST VIRGINIA
With its long history of oil and gas jurisprudence, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has addressed the precise issue of which
substances are properly included in a grant or reservation of “minerals.”
For example, early cases held that a reservation of “the right to all minerals
in and under . . . the land” included oil and gas.286 More recently, the West
In interpreting this instrument certain rules of construction are applicable: (1) the
nature and quantity of the interest conveyed must be ascertained from the instrument
itself and cannot be orally shown in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake and we
seek to ascertain not what the parties may have intended by the language but what is
the meaning of the words . . .; (2) effect must be given to all the language of the
instrument and no part shall be rejected if it can be given a meaning . . .; (3) if a doubt
arises concerning the interpretation of the instrument it will be resolved against the
party who prepared it . . .; (4) unless contrary to the plain meaning of the instrument,
an interpretation given it by the parties themselves will be favored . . .; (5) to ascertain
the intention of the parties, the language of a deed should be interpreted in the light of
the subject matter, the apparent object or purpose of the parties and the conditions
existing when it was executed . . . .
(internal quotations marks omitted) (citations omitted); see also Hess v. Jones, 7 A.2d 299, 300-01
(Pa. 1939) (setting out guidelines for the construction of written instruments).
282. Butler, 29 A.3d at 41-42.
283. Id. at 43.
284. Id.
285. See generally Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 41 A.3d 854 (Pa. 2012).
286. See Sult v. A. Hochstetter Oil Co., 61 S.E. 307, 308 (W. Va. 1908).
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Virginia high court offered the following summary of the state’s precedent
with respect to deed reservations in general.287
First, the court must “place itself in the situation of the parties, as near
as may be, to determine the meaning and intent of the language employed
in the deed.” Where applicable, “reservations are strictly construed against
a grantor and in favor of a grantee” as to whether the language creates an
ambiguity.288 If a deed is “unambiguous there is no need for construction
and it is the duty of the court to give to every word its usual
meaning . . . [and] will endeavor to carry into effect the intent of the parties
to the agreement, seeking first to ascertain such intent from the instrument
itself.”289 To discern that intent from the instrument, the court will afford
the language “its plain and ordinary meaning without resort to judicial
construction.”290 Rather, the parties will be bound to the “general and
ordinary meanings of words used in deeds.”291 Nonetheless, “[a]s a general
rule, ambiguities in a deed are to be clarified by resort to the intention of the
parties ascertained from the deed itself, the circumstances surrounding its
execution, as well as the subject matter and the parties’ situation at that
time.”292
The court most recently addressed the scope of “other minerals” in
West Virginia Department of Highways v. Farmer, where it considered the
single question of whether sand and gravel under and upon a surface
owner’s parcel “is included in a reservation of the ‘oil, gas and other
minerals.’”293 Eventually ruling in the negative, the court’s opinion in
Farmer exemplifies the state’s rather confused line of cases regarding the
application of canons of construction to oil and gas instruments.294 As in all
cases resting on canons to resolve facial ambiguity, the factual context in
Farmer is crucial to understanding the court’s logic. Farmer, who acquired
the subject surface acreage long after severance, was compensated by jury
award at eminent domain proceedings after the state highway agency
removed sand and gravel from his land for use in road construction.295
Parties owning the rights to “all oil and gas and other minerals” under
287. See generally Meadows v. Belknap, 483 S.E.2d 826 (W. Va. 1997).
288. See id. at 829.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 829-30.
291. See id. at 830.
292. Id. at 829 (citing Brown v. Crozer Coal & Land Co., 107 S.E.2d 777 (W. Va. 1959);
Oresta v. Romano Brothers, Inc., 73 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1952); Ramage v. South Penn Oil Co.,
118 S.E. 162 (W. Va. 1923)).
293. Farmer, 226 S.E.2d at 719.
294. See, e.g., Toothman v. Courtney, 58 S.E. 915, 918 (W. Va. 1907).
295. See Farmer, 226 S.E.2d at 719.
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Farmer’s tract intervened seeking their respective 9/10ths interest in this
award.296 Thus, the posture of the case before the Supreme Court of
Appeals was whether sand and gravel remained with the burdened surface
estate or passed to mineral owners by virtue of the language “other
minerals.”
In considering whether the term “minerals” created ambiguity in the
deed, the court acknowledged West Virginia precedent provided a broad
plain meaning approach that typically includes sand and gravel as
minerals.297 As held in Waugh v. Thompson Land & Coal Co.,298 “[t]he
word ‘mineral’ in its ordinary and common meaning is a comprehensive
term including every description of stone and rock deposit, whether
containing metallic or nonmetallic substances.”299 The court then noted that
“where language in a deed is unambiguous there is no need for construction
and it is the duty of the court to give to every word its usual meaning.”300
In the alternative, “where an ambiguity is introduced by the restrictive
language, making unclear the intention of the grantors in reserving minerals
from a conveyance, construction of the language is in order and the
surrounding circumstances and actions of the parties may be considered.”301
The court found the deed ambiguous based on the language itself,
which “did not specifically reserve the sand and gravel,” and the
“surrounding circumstances and past activities concerning this property.”302
These surrounding circumstances relevant to the court included evidence
that when the deed was executed, sand and gravel were not sold from the
land or in the area, and that Farmer knew of the sand when he purchased the
land for farming purposes.303 Thus finding the plain meaning definition in
Waugh inapplicable, the court explained that “accepted rules of
construction must be employed” to resolve the ambiguous intent of the
original grantor.304
Relying on a seemingly random set of canons, the court proceeded to
discuss various construction tactics in a troublingly unclear fashion. First,
the court applied ejusdem generis, explaining that canon provides: “where
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. 137 S.E. 895 (W. Va. 1927).
299. See Waugh, 137 S.E. at 897; see also Robinson v. Wheeling Steel & Iron Co., 129 S.E.
311, 312 (W. Va. 1925); Ramage v. South Penn Oil Co., 118 S.E. 162, 163 (W. Va. 1923); Horse
Creek Land & Mining Co. v. Midkiff, 95 S.E. 26, 27 (W. Va. 1918).
300. Farmer, 226 S.E.2d at 719 (citing Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co., 71 S.E.2d 65 (W. Va.
1952); Burdette v. Bruen, 191 S.E. 360 (W. Va. 1937)).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, such general
words are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same kind, class or nature as those
specifically mentioned.”305 In ruling that ejusdem generis would exclude
sand and gravel from the class created by “oil and gas in and under,” the
court simply concluded that such language connotes only petroleum
products and nothing more:
Applying this doctrine to the language of the reservation in the
instant case, the enumeration of oil and gas makes meaningless the
term ‘other minerals,’ except for minerals which are of the same
kind, class or nature, that is, petroleum products. A grant or
reservation of specifically named minerals conveys and reserves
rights only in those minerals. Under this doctrine, then, sand and
gravel are excluded from the reservation.306
The next canon considered by the court was contra proferentum –
“where an ambiguity exists in an instrument, the language will be construed
against the grantor.”307 The court did not cite to a wealth of precedent
related to mineral deed construction and this canon, but rather noted that
“[r]estrictive covenants are to be strictly construed against the person
seeking to enforce them, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of natural
rights and a free use of property, and against restrictions.”308 Without
making conclusions in this regard, the court observed that in this case “the
[mineral owners] seek to include sand and gravel in the reservation [while]
the Farmers seek a free use of their property.”309 However, the actual
circumstances of this case concerned compensation for property taken by
eminent domain – unfortunately the court did not clarify how either party to
the title dispute could garner support from a specified ‘free use’ policy
under these facts.
The court continued this superficial analysis, next with reference to a
similar cases that excluded sand and gravel from the phrase “and other
minerals” because these materials “had no rare character or value and

305. Id. at 719-20 (citing Bischoff v. Francesa, 56 S.E.2d 865 (W. Va. 1949); Neekamp v.
Huntington Chamber of Commerce, 129 S.E. 314 (W. Va. 1925); Jones v. Island Creek Coal Co.,
91 S.E. 391 (W. Va. 1917)).
306. See id. at 720 (citing Prindle v. Baker, 178 S.E. 513 (W. Va. 1935); Ramage v. South
Penn Oil Co., 118 S.E. 162 (W. Va. 1923)).
307. Id. This is but one example of the somewhat unclear variation of this ‘construe against
the drafter’ canon as ‘against the grantor.’
308. Id. (quoting Neekamp v. Huntington Chamber of Comm., 129 S.E. 314 (W. Va. 1925)).
309. Id. at 720-21.
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[were] useful only in road building . . . .”310 Without expounding on this
reference to ‘rare value’ found in other states, the court then focused on
prior use and held:
Farmer purchased [and used] the subject land for the purpose of
engaging in farming . . . . No owner of the minerals in the past had
ever attempted to exercise any control whatsoever over the sand
and gravel. It is readily discernible that the reservation of the
minerals created in 1911, did not intend to include sand and
gravel. Were it otherwise, the sand and gravel which lay
principally on the surface, could be taken by the owners of the
minerals and the surface owners could be deprived entirely of the
use of such surface. The conveyance to the Farmers would be
useless.311
To wrap up its analysis with a final bit of opacity, the court concluded that
the above reasoning “was the opinion of the courts in Colorado, Texas, and
Louisiana” in Farrell v. Sayre,312 Acker v. Guinn,313 and Holloway Gravel
Co. v. McKowen,314 respectively. Interestingly, Farrell ultimately applies a
‘community knowledge’ test to its holding, while Acker and McKowen are
touchstone surface destruction cases;315 however, neither canon was
specifically mentioned in Farmer.
Nonetheless, based on these
circumstances, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found sand
and gravel excluded from the reservation.316
H. TENNESSEE
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has had occasion to address the
question, “what substances are included in a grant or reservation of
‘minerals.’” In Campbell v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co.,317 the
court adopted a version of the rule of practical construction in its approach
to such disputes.318 In that case, a reservation of “all the mines or minerals

310. Id. (citing Dawson v. Meike, 508 P.2d 15 (Wyo. 1973); Elkhorn City Land Co. v.
Elkhorn City, 459 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. 1970); Hwy Comm’n v. Trujillo, 487 P.2d 122 (N.M. 1971)).
311. Id.
312. 270 P.2d 190 (Colo. 1954).
313. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
314. 9 So. 2d 228 (La. 1942).
315. The Farmer court itself quotes Acker for the proposition that a substance will not be
severed under a grant or reservation of “minerals” if it “must be removed by methods that will, in
effect, consume or deplete the surface estate.” Id. at 720-21 (citing Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d
348 (Tex. 1971)).
316. See id. at 828.
317. 265 S.W. 674 (Tenn. 1924).
318. Campbell, 265 S.W. at 678.
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contained or imbedded in or on said tract” was reserved unto grantor.319
Grantor’s successor in interest, the defendant in the case, contended that
said reservation included limestone.320
While the crux of the court’s construction targeted the reservation
language as written, it explained the scope of its interpretive focus as a
broader consideration of the parties’ overall intent, which can be
ascertained only when considering the surrounding circumstances of the
conveyance. The court affords notable weight to the unambiguous intent of
the grantor. However, if the grantor’s intent remains unclear, the court will
resolve such ambiguities in the agreement against him and in the grantee’s
favor.321 Thus, the court limits its focus to the nature of the grantor-grantee
relationship and the dealings between them rather than “arbitrary definitions
in reference to mineral substances buried in the earth.”322
The court began by interpreting the language used and cited by
numerous commentators on the meaning of “mines” and “minerals.”
Several cases and other authorities drew a distinction between a “mine,”
which is a location where the subsurface is excavated without breaking the
surface, and a “quarry,” which is the opening of the surface to remove a
material.323 The court also recognized that the term “mineral” is susceptible
to multiple definitions based upon its context.324 Specifically, if given a
broad definition, the term might embrace even the soil; if restricted to
precious metals, it would be limited too significantly; if distinguished from
the agricultural part of the land, it would be unhelpful in desert or rocky
lands not suitable for agricultural purposes.325
The court also looked to the circumstances of the case to find that
limestone was deposited along bluffs and along the surface throughout the
property in issue and that at the time of the reservation limestone had no
commercial value.326 For the reservation to be construed to include the
limestone, it would destroy the conveyance, because quarrying that
substance would destroy the whole surface.327 Therefore, it should be
obvious that the parties did not intend limestone to be included; if they did,
they would have explicitly included it in the reservation.328
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id. at 674.
Id.
Id. at 676.
Id. at 677 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 677-78.
Id.
Id. at 676.
Id. Note use of the surface destruction test.
Id.
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As recently as 2011, the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the
need to resort to a practical construction of a deed when answering a similar
question. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee filed
a certification order before the high court seeking an answer to whether a
1928 mineral reservation included sandstone.329 The court stated that the
question was not purely a matter of law but required analysis of relevant
facts. Indeed “the term ‘mineral’ is ambiguous,” and “each case requiring
its construction ‘must be determined upon its peculiar facts, giving due
consideration to the intention of the parties.”330
I.

VIRGINIA

Virginia case law shows that courts in that state are intent upon finding
the most reasonable interpretation, in each case, based upon the intent of the
parties at the time the instrument was executed. As early as 1903, the
Virginia Supreme Court in White v. Sayers331 applied “well-settled rules of
construction” to determine whether a contract establishing a partnership to
explore for “minerals” which might be found in paying quantities
effectively conveyed ownership of coal. The principles that guided the
court were as follows:
Regard should be had to the intention of the parties, and such
intention should be given effect. To arrive at this intention, regard
is to be had to the situation of the parties, the subject matter of the
agreement, the object which the parties had in view at the time and
intended to accomplish. A construction should be avoided, if it
can be done consistently with the tenor of the agreement, which
would be unreasonable or unequal, and that construction which is
most obviously just is to be favored as most in accordance with the
presumed intention of the parties.332
The best construction is that which is made by viewing the subject
of the contract as the mass of mankind would view it; for it may be
329. Heineman v. Terra Enters., LLC, No. M2011-00559-SC-R23-CQ, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS
531, at *1 (Tenn. May 27, 2011).
330. Id. (citing Campbell Tenn. Coal Iron & R.R. Co., 265 S.W. 674, 677 (Tenn. 1924);
State v. Lahiere-Hill, LLC, 278 S.W.3d 745, 749-52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)). But see Murray v.
Allred, 43 S.W. 355, 359-60 (Tenn. 1897) (considering a description of the substances at issue to
determine that oil and gas are both minerals falling within the reservation of “all mines, minerals,
and metals under the land” and appearing not to factor into that decision any relevant
circumstances other than the fact that the “bulk of mankind” would likely also include those
substances within the reservation).
331. 45 S.E. 747 (Va. 1903).
332. White, 45 S.E. at 749 (quoting Shen. L., &c. Co. v. Hise, 23 S.E. 303, 304 (Va. 1895))
(emphasis added). Note that this, along with the subsequent two guidelines, are essentially the
practical construction test.
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safely assumed that such was the aspect in which the parties
themselves viewed it.333
In the construction of a contract the whole instrument is to be
considered; not any one provision only, but all its provisions; not
the words merely in which they were expressed, but their object
and purpose, as disclosed by the language, by the subject matter,
and the condition and relation of the parties.334
The court applied these principles to determine that the agreement was
more in the nature of a partnership agreement than a mineral conveyance.
Therefore, the parties were free to end the partnership by mutual
agreement.335 Furthermore, at the time the contract was entered into, coal
had no value, and that was the case for more than forty years. Rather, at
that time, gold was the mineral causing great excitement in the area. In
fact, it was only a few years before the action was instituted that coal gained
any appreciable value. Based on these facts, the court determined that the
term “minerals” was not intended to include coal in that case.336
Since the White case, Virginia has not waivered from this interpretation
of the question “what does the term ‘minerals’ include?” In 1928, the
Supreme Court of Virginia determined that a reservation of “metals and
minerals” did not include limestone.337 Stating that the decision should
always turn on the language at issue, the surrounding circumstances, and
the grantor’s intent, if known, the court considered various pieces of
evidence.338 The factor that appeared to be the most significant was that the
surface of most land in the area was comprised of limestone: “In this
limestone country, where a grant of land is made, and the minerals and right
to remove them are reserved, the language ought to be clear and specific to
justify a construction that would allow the reservation to take back or
destroy the thing that is granted.”339 Therefore, the court construed the
reservation as not intending to include limestone.340 This same reasoning
was again applied in 1966, when the court decided that “minerals” did not
include sand and gravel, because, although technically minerals, those
substances made up the whole surface.341
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id. (quoting Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Moore, 2 Whart. 477, 491 (Pa. 1837)).
Id. (quoting Millan v. Kephart, 18 Gratt. 1, 10 (Va. 1867)).
Id. at 748.
Id. Note reliance on a version of the exceptional characteristics test.
Beury v. Shelton, 144 S.E. 629, 633 (Va. 1928).
Id. at 632.
Id. at 633.
Id.
Shores v. Shaffer, 146 S.E.2d 190, 193-94 (Va. 1966).
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The current situation facing the oil and gas industry as various parties
attempt to settle mineral ownership disputes is a type of litigation paradox.
In most jurisdictions (other than those that have set by statute or by
definitive precedent the interpretation to be given to language in a deed),
the only way to achieve predictability and settled precedent is through
continued litigation. However, the most significant practical goal of
drafting these instruments is to unambiguously detail the parties’ rights and
thereby avoid litigation. Another consideration adding to the complexity of
this issue is an understanding that one weak link in the chain of title can
affect ownership, despite the parties’ present attempts to limit ambiguity in
their drafting. Unfortunately, no clear solution exists for correcting the
problems that result from inconsistent application of canons of construction.
Instead, courts should determine which policy consideration is more
important, free will to contract or predictability, and apply canons more
consistently.
Whether it is desirable, or even feasible, to have a uniform definition of
the term “minerals” in this context, is certainly a decision to be made on a
state-by-state basis. For some states, ascertaining the intent of the parties is
a weightier policy consideration. In those states, determinations are always
made on a case-by-case basis to determine what the original parties to the
particular contract intended.342 Such an approach, at first blush, may appear
to be more equitable. However, the search for intent often becomes more
about the application of canons of construction; in that situation, who can
say that the meaning finally determined to be the parties’ “intent” was what
those individuals had in mind when executing the deed decades ago?343
This approach stands in stark contrast to that taken in other states,
which favor an established rule of law for reliably determining mineral
ownership. North Dakota, for example, has statutorily set the interpretation
342. See, e.g., Heineman v. Terra Enters., LLC, No. M2011-00559-SC-R23-CQ, 2011 Tenn.
LEXIS 531, at *1 (Tenn. May 27, 2011) (“Each case involving the interpretation of a contract or
deed that grants or reserves mineral rights ‘must be decided upon the language of the grant or
reservation, the surrounding circumstances and the intention of the grantor, if it can be
ascertained. The adoption of arbitrary definitions in reference to mineral substances buried in the
earth is not permissible.’” (quoting Campbell v. Tenn. Coal. Iron & R.R. Co., 265 S.W. 674, 677
(Tenn. 1924))).
343. See, e.g., McCormick v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 14 P.3d 346, 353 n.7 (Colo. 2000) (“It
seems highly unrealistic to attempt to determine, at a later date, whether, in an early conveyance,
the parties intended to include or to exclude oil and gas from their usage of the term “minerals,”
where such intent is purportedly determined by reference to ‘facts and circumstances then
existing’ and of which adequate proof has long since vanished. All too often this ‘intent,’ as
determined, results from application of the rules of evidence concerning burden of proof and
presumptions, which have little relevance to the actual intent of the parties.” (omitting internal
reference)).
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to be given to the term “mineral” as used in a conveyance of real estate,344
although the definition is not applicable to instruments executed prior to the
enactment of the statute.345 Other states have determined through case law
that the term “other minerals” unambiguously includes “oil and gas” and
that extrinsic evidence will not be admitted to show otherwise.346 The
outcome in these states will obviously at times conflict with the original
parties’ intent and can be viewed as obstructing the free will to contract.
However, the predictability afforded to title examiners and property owners,
especially for the purpose of securing the capital needed for mineral
development, may be deemed to outweigh any detriment to intent.
For the foregoing reasons, courts must more carefully apply canons of
construction. First, they should understand that canons are intended to
apply to situations when intent cannot otherwise be found on the face of a
written instrument. It is when the language is evenly predisposed to
multiple interpretations that canons may be used to shift the scales in favor
of one over the others. For example, a court may apply the doctrine of
contra proferentum to favor the equally plausible interpretation that most
benefits the party who did not select the document’s language. Further,
courts must more clearly state the factors they consider when deciding
which specific canons to apply;347 what, if any, extrinsic evidence is
appropriate for consideration in specific contexts; and what effect this
precedent should have on other similarly drafted documents.348 Only
through this clarity can title examiners and averred owners find comfort in
opinions relating to title ownership.

344. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24, -25 (2011).
345. See McDonald v. Antelope Land & Cattle Co., 294 N.W.2d 391, 393 (N.D. 1980).
346. See, e.g., Spurlock v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 694 P.2d 299, 308-09 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984); McCormick, 14 P.3d at 353-54 (“Allowing the introduction of extrinsic evidence many
decades after the deed conveyances . . . invites uncertainty and litigation . . . . [W]e hold that a
deed reservation for ‘other minerals’ reserves oil and gas . . . . We treat this matter as one of
property law and determine that precedent forecloses the question . . . for trial.”); Miller Land &
Mineral Co. v. State Highway Comm’n, 757 P.2d 1001, 1002-03 (Wyo. 1988) (“We hold that the
mineral reservation ‘reserving unto Grantor, all minerals and mineral rights existing under
said . . . lands’ expresses a clear and unambiguous intent by the grantor to reserve all the minerals,
whatever they may be.”).
347. Although not technically binding, such guidance would be useful to future courts and
for parties attempting to ascertain mineral ownership.
348. For example, will a decision that a reservation of “oil, gas, and other minerals” includes
coal apply to a document that reserves “all minerals;” would this decision be different if a
similarly-worded instrument was executed under different circumstances, at a different period of
time, in a different area; etc.?

